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AVICENNA THE COMMENTATOR
Allan Bäck 
A commentator should provide all the premises that are needed, and omit 
nothing but the obvious and the superfl uous, for the most incompetent 
commentator is he who uses in his commentary premises more cryptic 
than, or as cryptic as, the premises of  whatever he is commenting upon. 
These commentaries which [purport to] bring us the truth conceal in 
fact the theses better than the original texts, while what they conceal 
most is errors.1
Avicenna has never had high standing as a commentator on Aristotle. 
In the scholarly world today, he, like any other Islamic medieval philoso-
pher, has the automatic curse of  not working from the original Greek 
in critical editions. He has the additional stigma of  having received as 
Aristotle’s work various spurious works, including Neoplatonist treatises 
by Proclus and Plotinus like the Liber de causis.2 
Even in the medieval Islamic culture, his encyclopedic Aš-Šhifā (the 
Healing or Cure), where he did write on many of  Aristotle’s works, was 
not viewed as faithful commentary. Consequently, so the story goes, 
Averroes was asked by Abū Ya{qūb to write a set of  commentaries 
more textually based.3 
Certainly, this assessment of  Avicenna has some merit. He often 
departs from the text of  Aristotle even when commenting upon it. 
He does so in various ways. (1) He states sometimes that Aristotle is 
just wrong, for instance, in his doctrine that in thinking the thinker 
becomes identical to the object thought.4 Again, when commenting upon 
1 “Memoirs of  a Disciple [of  Avicenna ] from Rayy,” §10, trans. Dmitri Gutas , 
Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden, 1988), pp. 71–2. 
2 For this standard story cf. Frederick Copleston , A History of  Medieval Philosophy (New 
York, 1972), pp. 106–7; F. Van Steenberghen 1970, Aristote en occident (Louvain, 1946), 
trans. as Aristotle in the West, trans. L. Johnston (Louvain, 1970), pp. 17–9; É. Gilson , 
History of  Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), pp. 181–2.
3 Dominque Urvoy , “Ibn Rushd,” in History of  Islamic Philosophy, eds. S. Nasr & O. 
Leaman (London, 1996), pp. 330–345, p. 332. This story cannot be completely true, 
as we now know that prior to Avicenna there were many faithful commentaries written 
in Arabic on Aristotle’s works, especially at the bayt al-hikma. See n. 51.
4 On the Soul 420a19–20; Fī Nafs, ed. G. Anawati (Cairo, 1962) 212,12–213,8.
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the ontological square, the fourfold division of  beings in Categories 2, 
Avicenna rejects it and replaces it with a fi vefold division.5 In such cases 
Avicenna is offering his own views as substitutes. (2) Other times, he 
omits discussing what Aristotle says. Thus, in his Al-Ilāhiyyāt (Metaphysica) 
Avicenna ignores some books of  Aristotle’s Metaphysics, like Book IV. 
Again, Avicenna’s Physics hardly has the organization of  Aristotle’s. (3) 
Other times, he adds on a lot of  material purportedly consistent with 
Aristotle’s text, with the aim of  defending or elaborating on it. Thus, in 
Al-Ilāhiyyāt Avicenna adds on discussions about the necessary being and 
prophecy. Likewise the organization of  the Qīyās hardly follows that of  
the Prior Analytics, although Avicenna does end up covering most of  the 
material there, while adding much more. (4) In some cases his attempts 
at a literal commentary fail ludicrously, as in his discussion of  the Poetics 
where he attempts to describe Greek tragedies without having ever read 
or seen one.6 (I shall not be discussing this last type as it hardly gives 
Avicenna a claim for being a pre-eminent commentator. For it consists 
of  standard, literal commentary, just done badly.)
The fi rst three types of  cases differ signifi cantly. In the fi rst type 
Avicenna goes where, he believes, the truth leads him at the expense 
of  what Aristotle has said. As a result, we have an explanation incon-
sistent with Aristotle’s doctrines. In the second and third types, we have 
material being introduced or omitted so as presumably to increase 
our understanding of  the material being discussed by extending its 
doctrines. Such additions and omissions can remain consistent with 
Aristotle’s doctrines. As for the omissions, Avicenna generally does 
discuss that material somewhere: he has just reorganized their presen-
tation. Thus he does discuss the material of  Metaphysics IV in various 
places: e.g., what is meant by genus, species, difference, etc. appears 
in his commentary on Porphyry (the Logica of  the Avicenna Latinus); in 
his summaries as well he explains the meaning of  many terms and 
reorganizes Aristotle’s doctrines quite a lot.7 We can then fi nd some 
justifi cation for a commentary deviating from the text in the second or 
5 Al-Maqūlāt, eds. G. Anawati et al. (Cairo, 1959), pp. 18,4–20,3. See Allan Bäck , 
“Avicenna ’s Ontological Pentagon,” The Journal of  Neoplatonic Studies 7.2 (1999), 
87–109.
6 Avicenna , Aš-Ši{ r, ed. {A. Badawī (Cairo, 1966). See my Review of  Averroes ’ Middle 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, trans. Charles Butterworth, Canadian Philosophical Reviews 
(1990), 92–101. 
7 I am thinking of  An-Najāt (Salvation), Al-Išhārāt (Pointers), and the Persian Dānešnāme 
(trans. Morewedge as The Metaphysica of  Avicenna ). 
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third way: the commentator is rearranging the material so as to make 
it more comprehensible. Yet the fi rst way, rejecting what Aristotle says 
outright, hardly looks like a commentary at all, but instead an inde-
pendent work. So too we might make this assessment for the so-called 
“Glosses” of  Abelard on Porphyry. 
Nevertheless I wish to explore the option that Avicenna remains 
a “faithful commentator” of  Aristotle. For, if  a commentary has the 
function of  helping us to understand the material and the issues being 
discussed, and Avicenna presents materials that increase our under-
standing beyond what Aristotle has said, perhaps then he is writing 
commentaries of  high value. To be sure, a commentary also has the 
function of  helping us to understand the text being commented upon 
and its author’s intentions, context etc. in its own terms and on its own 
standards. Avicenna does not focus on such tasks, and when he does, he 
has no special claim to excellence (as in the example of  the Poetics just 
mentioned. Such literal commentary amounts to parsing or paraphras-
ing and giving historical background. Yet, on the other hand, if  we 
understand the issues being raised by a text in terms other than those 
given in the text, we might then be able to appreciate that text more so 
than if  we had stuck to a literal explicatione de texte. We can understand 
what, say, Aristotle was struggling with and what he was trying, in a 
pioneering way, to get at. Pioneering efforts often have clumsy features, 
as the path of  terminology, theory, articulation of  detail etc. has not 
yet been laid down for those coming later to follow. 
So I do not fi nd it obvious just what constitutes a “good” commentary. 
I will start by discussing the attitudes of  the person being commented 
upon about commentaries. For Aristotle himself  commented upon the 
work of  other philosophers, and wrote, if  not “commentaries” in the 
customary sense, at the least critiques like the Peri Ideōn. Let us consider 
what The Philosopher does here. 
Aristotle as Commentator
. . . our duty [is] for the sake of  maintaining the truth even to destroy what 
touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers; for, while both are 
dear, piety requires us to honor truth above our friends.8 
8 Nicomachean Ethics 1096a14–7.
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In what sense would Aristotle himself  understand ‘commentator’? Look 
at how Aristotle himself  commented upon his predecessors—notably 
Plato . Certainly in his Metaphysics Aristotle thinks that he is giving the 
history of  fi rst philosophy. He comments upon the theories of  his 
predecessors, mostly with the goal of  showing how his own theory 
incorporates all their insights without their shortcomings.9 
Earlier Aristotle scholars generally accepted Aristotle as a reliable 
chronicler and commentator. For instance, W. D. Ross generally takes 
Aristotle to give an accurate history of  philosophy.10 Taylor , Burnet , and 
Guthrie may have had occasional doubts but generally concurred.11 
However it has now become a commonplace among scholars of  
Aristotle’s predecessors to assert that Aristotle misunderstands their 
views badly. For example, Kirk , Raven and Schofi eld claim that “his 
judgments are often distorted by his view of  earlier philosophy as a 
stumbling progress to the truth that Aristotle revealed.”12 Thus they 
suggest that Aristotle is mistaken about the signifi cance of  Zeno ’s 
arrow paradox.13 If  you look at random for other recent discussions 
of  Aristotle in the treatment of  the Presocratics, you will routinely fi nd 
many such remarks. 
Now if  this current assessment of  Aristotle’s scholarly abilities holds, 
Aristotle fails by his own standards. For he relies heavily on an endoxic 
method. We begin our scientifi c study, he says, from looking at phenom-
ena and endoxa.14 As with astronomy, all the sciences must preserve the 
phenomena.15 For him the phenomena are the things as they appear 
to us, at times contrasted with how they are in themselves. The endoxa 
are the opinions that are generally or mostly accepted by anyone and, 
even more so, the opinions of  the experts.16 
 9 Metaphysics 988a18–23.
10 Metaphysics, vol. I, pp. xxxv–li,
11 A. E. Taylor , Varia Socratica (Oxford, 1911), pp. 84–7; J. Burnet , Early Greek 
Philosophy, 3rd ed. (London, 1920), vol. I, pp. 230–7; W. K. C. Guthrie , A History of  
Greek Philosophy, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1962). 
12 The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1983) p. 3.
13 The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 273.
14 De Caelo 306a5–17; Analytica Priora 46a 17–22. Aristotle also seems at times to 
identify this mathematical method with a “dialectical” method. Cf. Physica 204b4, and 
Allan Bäck , “Aristotle’s Discovery of  First Principles,” in From Puzzles to Principles, ed. 
May Sim (Lanham, Maryland, 1999), 163–182.
15 William Wians , “Saving Aristotle from Nussbaum ’s Phainomena,” in Essays in Ancient 
Greek Philosophy V, eds. A Preus & J. Anton (Albany, 1992), p. 135.
16 Topics 100b21–3. See J. D. G. Evans , Aristotle’s Concept of  Dialectic (Cambridge, 1977), 
pp. 77–8 on diffi culties of  translating ‘endoxon’. I shall just use ‘endoxon’.
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Even in the sciences Aristotle uses endoxa. As Owen made well known, 
Aristotle complicates his conception of  phenomena considerably.17 In 
his ethics he begins his discussion of  acrasia (incontinence) by rehears-
ing “the phenomena.” Yet he does not make observations of  human 
behavior. Rather, he identifi es these phenomena with the endoxa, the 
reputable opinions. [1145b2–6] On account of  this, Owen claims that 
Aristotle uses ‘phenomena’ ambiguously: on the one hand to designate 
the empirical, given by sense perception, and on the other to designate 
the dialectical, given by widely accepted or reputable opinion. Indeed, 
in some texts Aristotle opposes phenomena and endoxa, and in others he 
assimilates them, even in his treatises on natural science.18 At times the 
contrast between phenomena and endoxa seems to disappear. Aristotle 
himself  identifi es the phenomena with the endoxa in his ethical investi-
gation of  acrasia. Again, in his study of  the fi rst principles common to 
all sciences in his science of  being qua being, Aristotle examines endoxa 
dialectically by way of  establishing them as fi rst principles. Also, in 
justifying particular concepts in his Physics, Aristotle again appeals to 
endoxa, e.g., for his concept of  place. [211a4–11] Aristotle blurs their 
difference even more when he distinguishes endoxa from “apparent 
endoxa” (φαινομένων ἐνδόξων).19 
Nussbaum offers a way of  thinking of  Aristotle’s conceptions of  
phenomena and endoxa consistently.20 If  we understand Aristotle to hold 
Quine ’s view, that even sense perceptions are a theory-laden part of  
the fabric of  our web of  belief, then the empirical and the dialectical 
both concern opinion. We have no hard facts, just our beliefs about 
the world. Some beliefs may have a stronger tie to the stimulus mean-
ing of  sensation than others, and so are more empirical. Still scientifi c 
knowledge, like all other conversation, falls within the hermeneutical 
circle of  our society and its ideology.
In any event, Aristotle does not equate endoxa in the dialectical 
inquiry of  philosophy and science with majority opinion. He weights 
expert opinion more.21 Insofar as common people themselves defer to 
the opinions of  experts, we might say that deferring to experts agrees 
17 G. E. L. Owen , “Tithenai ta Phainomena,” in Logic, Science, and Dialectic, ed. Martha 
Nussbaum (Ithaca, 1986), p. 240.
18 E.g., Generation of  Animals 725b5–6; 729b9–10; 760b27–33; Parts of  Animals 
648a20ff.
19 Topics 100b25.
20 Martha Nussbaum , The Fragility of  Goodness (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 244; 274–5.
21 C. D. C. Reeve , Practices of  Reason (Oxford, 1992), pp. 35–6. 
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with common opinion, especially when the subject concerns something 
about which common people have no fi rm opinion (e.g., the sex life of  
nematodes), but when the expert and the common opinions diverge, 
Aristotle weights expert opinion more. Yet this weighting narrows the 
gulf  between the phenomena which are true and the endoxa, which seem 
to be true. Too, phenomena themselves are literally appearances, how 
the world appears to us. As we judge, categorize, and refl ect upon our 
sensations, the phenomena may well be thought to end up amounting 
to give what seems to us to be true, with special reliance on those who 
have observed carefully and repeatedly. 
In our terms, Aristotle recommends doing a survey of  the litera-
ture and critique of  past theories if  available before proceeding to do 
scientifi c research via direct observation and experiment and theory 
construction. Now, if  Aristotle so radically misunderstands his predeces-
sors, he is failing in this dialectical task and in his science. 
We might use caution in accepting the opinions of  current scholars 
on Aristotle as commentator, especially when their work focuses on 
Aristotle’s predecessors. One always has the suspicion of  people cheer-
leading for the philosopher on whom they have devoted so much time. 
Moreover, it is curious, if  Aristotle fails so badly in understanding his 
predecessors, why those who followed and critiqued him did not seize 
on the point more than they do? For many of  the Greek commentators 
were Neoplatonists . They may modify Aristotle’s doctrines, but gener-
ally accept his views of  his predecessors.22 Even Plotinus proceeds in 
critiquing Aristotle not so much by showing how he misunderstands 
Plato but by defending Plato’s views and picking holes in Aristotle’s 
objections and own positions. 
In any case, I am focusing here not on Aristotle’s actual prowess as a 
commentator but rather on the standards he has for good commentary, 
regardless of  whether he meets his own standards or not. So, putting 
caveats on his excellence as a commentator aside, let us concentrate on 
what Aristotle offers, or at any rate uses, as criteria for a commentary. 
For him a commentary is both a report and critique on certain endoxa, 
the opinions of  the experts, preferably their opinions as recorded in 
written form. We can see Aristotle himself  writing such commentaries. 
Aristotle went to great lengths to collect descriptions of  phenomena, 
customs etc. We need only think of  his collection of  constitutions with 
22 The commentaries of  Simplicius and Alexander (pseudo and real) for instance.
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accompanying analyses, his collections of  observations of  natural phe-
nomena (including ones that he did not make himself, e.g., on elephants 
and the gymnosophists),23 and his reviews of  past theories whenever 
starting a scientifi c inquiry. These reports then should be accurate. 
Note, however, that Aristotle, like the historians of  his time, tended 
not to insist on the historical accuracy of  exact quotation, description 
of  social and linguistic context, archival research etc. required by the 
historians of  our times. Still, I suppose his accounts of  his predecessors 
have about as much accuracy as the speeches that Thucydides puts into 
the mouths of  Spartans and Persians. 
Unlike modern historians and commentators, Aristotle insists also 
upon critiquing the views being commented upon. For he intends to use 
this material to seek the truth on the subject matter, and not ultimately 
the truth about who said what. We see a similar situation in his ethics. 
He wants to have a theory of  what is the highest good but not merely 
for the sake of  theory: “we are inquiring not in order to know what 
excellence is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry 
world have been of  no use.”24 To be sure, even modern historians 
organize their remarks and use the available primary historical data 
selectively, according to an ideology or according to a certain method, 
making many background foundational assumptions.25 Yet they tend 
to avoid making assessment of  value. In contrast, as Aristotle writes 
commentaries in order to use their results, his remarks have a certain 
focus largely absent in our modern commentaries. We separate theory 
and use, pure and applied science, scholarship and philosophizing, 
more sharply than he does.
Avicenna as Commentator
How then would Avicenna fare as a “commentator” in the Aristotelian 
tradition? 
Let me fi rst dispose of  the standard complaints against Islamic com-
mentators on Aristotle that I have mentioned at the beginning. To be 
sure they were Greek-less, although they had some contact with people 
23 E.g., the discussion of  elephants in History of  Animals I.10 and of  the naked soph-
ists in Fr. 35—if  that is not genuine, just use another of  Aristotle’s remarks on India.
24 Nicomachean Ethics 1103b26–9.
25 Cf. Marc Bloch , The Historian’s Craft, trans. P. Putnam (New York, 1953).
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fl uent in Greek. However, I fi nd the Arabic translations of  Æunayn Isāq 
quite accurate for most technical points in Aristotle’s texts. Moreover, 
the Islamic philosophers themselves were sensitive about problems of  
translation. Even before Avicenna , Islamic philosophers like al-Fārābī 
had long, sophisticated discussions about the various grammatical 
structures in Arabic, Greek, Persian, Syriac, Soghdian—as far as their 
linguistic resources permitted.26 
Moreover, Avicenna is no naïve reader, misled by having received 
Neoplatonist works by Proclus and Plotinus as written by Aristotle. He 
himself  expresses doubts about the authenticity of  the so-called Theology 
of  Aristotle, known now to be spurious.27 I give further examples below. 
So, I submit, let us not dismiss Avicenna ’s commentary on a priori 
grounds; instead, let us look at the contents of  his works. 
Avicenna claims to have written commentaries in his youth explicat-
ing Aristotle’s thought.28 These seem to have followed Aristotle’s texts 
fairly closely, giving explications of  his views. These early, fairly standard 
commentaries were apparently lost. Still we can perhaps get some sense 
of  what they were like, or even what they actually were, by looking 
at some parts of  his extant works. For, as Gutas has shown, Avicenna 
tended to recycle parts of  earlier works into his later works. Thus some 
parts of  the De Anima material of  Aš-Šhifā seem to have been written 
before.29 Again, the Poetics portion of  Aš-Šhifā entioned above may have 
been recycled, for it is a fairly literal commentary that seems to proceed 
by using a translation of  the Poetics along with its attendant marginalia 
so as to produce an explication as best as can be without having any 
independent knowledge of  Greek theater. 
However, Avicenna wrote another sort of  commentary later in his 
career. These followed the text much less closely and paraphrased far 
less. For in Hamma¦ān around 1016, Avicenna’s students had asked 
for him to replace these lost early commentaries. 
The hope of  ever obtaining his lost works having dimmed, we asked him 
to write them and he said, ‘I have neither the time nor the inclination 
to occupy myself  with close textual analysis and commentary. But if  you 
26 See my “Islamic Logic,” forthcoming.
27 “Letter to Kiyā,” section 3, in {A. Badawī , Aris¢ū {inda l-{Arab (Cairo, 1947), pp. 
120,9–122,8; trans. Gutas , Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, p. 64. 
28 Namely, Al-Æāsil wa-l-MaÉūl (The Available and the Valid ) probably in 1002 or 1003, 
following Gutas ’ dating.
29 Gutas , Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, pp. 104–5.
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would be content with whatever I have readily in mind [which I have 
thought] on my own, then I could write for you a comprehensive work 
arranged in the order which will occur to me.’ We readily offered our 
consent to this and urged that he start with physics.30
Avicenna states clearly that in these commentaries—comments if  you 
will—he will not be explicating Aristotle’s thought and so will not be 
writing the usual sort of  commentary. Rather, he shall be giving his 
own thoughts and theories on the topics and positions brought up by 
Aristotle: 
. . . if  you would like me to compose a book in which I will set forth what, 
in my opinion, is sound in these philosophical (sciences), without debat-
ing with those who disagree or occupying myself  with their refutation, 
then I will do that.31
Accordingly, in his Aš-Šhifā, some parts of  which constitute the Avicenna 
Latinus, Avicenna set out to “comment upon” a great portion of  
Aristotle’s works, including the whole of  the logic, much of  the works 
on the natural sciences, and the Metaphysics. He completed this mas-
sive undertaking in but a few years, from 1016–27, if  we are to believe 
the historical testimony—although it is likely that he used some earlier 
writings as some parts of  Aš-Šhifā.
In Aš-Šhifā Avicenna has respect but not reverence for Aristotle. On 
some topics, Avicenna thinks that Aristotle has the whole truth. For 
instance, concerning Aristotle’s classifi cation of  the fallacies, Avicenna 
says: 
. . . after almost one thousand three hundred and thirty years, was this goal 
reached by anyone who blamed Aristotle for being defi cient, and who was 
right in identifying a defect in him because Aristotle was in fact defi cient 
in such and such a matter? And did there appear after him anybody who 
added anything at all to this art [sophistics] beyond what Aristotle said? 
Certainly not; for what Aristotle did is complete and perfect.32 
In such parts of  Aš-Šhifā as the Sophistics then it is not surprising that 
Avicenna , perhaps using or borrowing from his earlier literal com-
mentaries, if  he had them available, offers something resembling a 
30 Introduction to Aš-Šhifā, Section 3, translated by Gutas , Avicenna and the Aristotelian 
Tradition, p. 101.
31 The Life of  Ibn Sina, ed. and trans. W. Gohlman (Albany, 1974), 54.1–5.
32 As-Safsa¢a, ed. A. Ehwany (Cairo, 1958), 114 §7; trans. Gutas , Avicenna and the 
Aristotelian Tradition, p. 37.
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usual commentary. Yet, even in such cases where Avicenna thinks that 
Aristotle has the right theory, he often proceeds to a critical discussion 
of  it. Here we may agree with Gutas : 
Avicenna presents himself  in the prologue to the Cure not as an anti-
Aristotelian despite himself, as al-Jūzjānī would have it, but as a conscious 
reformer of  the Aristotelian tradition, an attitude which is also apparent 
in the Introduction to The Easterners and shared by other disciples of  
his . . .33 
However, in other parts of  Aš-Šhifā Avicenna has a much harsher 
attitude about what Aristotle says. First, in general, Avicenna holds 
Aristotle’s logic to be defective, at least in the sense of  needing to be 
supplemented.34 Unlike Kant, Avicenna did not think that Aristotle 
had completed the whole of  formal logic. For instance, following the 
Stoics, Avicenna devoted a lot of  effort to working out the syllogistic 
for various sorts of  hypothetical statements in his Qīyās. Second, and 
more particularly, on the Categories, Avicenna follows the lead of  the 
Greek commentators who doubt the authenticity of  some passages of  
the Categories and who stress its use as a work for the beginner.35 He too 
doubts the authenticity of  the Categories as a whole.36 Yet, more than 
his predecessors, Avicenna stresses that the Categories is not so much 
for the philosopher as for the common people: not too technical nor 
of  much use.37 
Even here, though, Avicenna is not rejecting Aristotle’s views so much 
as reorganizing and extending them—perhaps, as I shall suggest below, 
following the lead of  al-Fārābī . For instance, Avicenna imports much 
of  the material on substance found in Metaphysics VII into his discus-
sion of  substance in Categories 5. Indeed, Avicenna discusses some of  
Aristotle’s doctrines in the Metaphysics, like focal meaning and the rela-
tion of  substance and form, more in this commentary on the Categories 
than in his “commentary” on the Metaphysics, Al-Ilāhiyyāt. Avicenna has 
the general habit of  reorganizing the sequence of  materials found in 
Aristotle, and Al-Maqūlāt is no exception.
33 Gutas , Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, p. 111. 
34 Ibid., 189.
35 E.g., Porphyry , in Cat. 134, 28–9; Ammonius , in Cat. 13, 20–8.
36 Al-Maqūlāt 8,11–5. So did earlier Islamic commentators, and to some extent Greek 
ones like Simplicius , in Cat. 18, 7–9. Cf. I. Madkour , L’Organon d’Aristote dans le monde 
arabe (Paris, 1934), pp. 78–9.
37 Al-Maqūlāt. 35,10–11; 35,20–36,2; 189,8–9; 264,7; 265,17.
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Avicenna viewed his audience to consist solely in the elite philoso-
phers. Rather like Confucius , who wanted only students who could 
bring back a square when given only a corner of  it [Analects 7:8], 
Avicenna would expect his audience to be able to reconstruct his posi-
tion from a few remarks. For him, the common people should not read 
philosophy. Like Plato , Avicenna wanted only the philosophers, and the 
worthy ones at that, to read his work. Avicenna believed Aristotle to 
hold the same view, due to a letter ascribed to Aristotle and written to 
Alexander . According to it, Aristotle was deliberately obscure in order 
to ward off  the common people.38 Likewise, al-Fārābī , whom Avicenna 
admired greatly, says:
Our style used an obscure way of  expression for three reasons: First, to 
test the nature of  the student in order to fi nd out whether he is suitable 
to be educated or not; second, to avoid lavishing philosophy on all people 
but only on those who were worthy of  it; and third, to train the mind 
through the exertion of  research.39
Religious traditions in Islam too had the custom of  withholding knowl-
edge from the hoi polloi and reserving it for the select few: 
I have forbidden all my friends who would read [this treatise] to squander 
it on an evil or obdurate person, or show it to them, or to deposit it where 
it does not belong, and bound them [by an oath] . . .40 
Like Maimonides later, Avicenna writes only for those who deserve 
to read. We know that he withheld his writings from many of  his 
contemporaries.
In short, Avicenna deliberately writes commentaries for the worthy 
few, the elite among the philosophers. Such an audience requires com-
mentaries not of  the usual sort. Such a commentary need not intro-
duce and explicate the text to be commented upon. Rather, it needs 
to illuminate that text, to give a perspective whereby its reader will be 
helped in assessing the merits of  that text. I have suggested that we 
view Aristotle as a “commentator” in the same way. 
38 Gellius , Noctes Atticae 20,5,11–2, in Aristoteles, Privatorum Scriptorum Fragmenta, ed. M. 
Plezia (Leipsig, 1977), 28. Cf. Simplicius , in Cat. 7, 6–9.
39 Mabādi, {Al-Falasafah Al-Qadīma (Cairo, 1910), p. 14, trans. Gutas , Avicenna and the 
Aristotelian Tradition, p. 227. 
40 Avicenna , Al-Mabda{ wa-l-Ma{ād [The Provenance and Destination], ed. {A. Nūrārī 
(Tehran, 1984), Ch. 16.3; trans. in Gutas , Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, p. 33. 
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Yet, even if  we accept such criteria for a commentary, surely the 
text of  Avicenna is so diffi cult and even convoluted so as to rule it out 
as a good commentary. Let me then comment upon Avicenna’s style 
and on his writings.41
Avicenna deliberately takes on an oracular style. We can see this just 
from the titles of  his works: The Cure, The Salvation, etc. He does so for 
various reasons: 1) on his own view, he has achieved an enlightenment 
stemming from the activation of  his active intellect and its permanent, 
actual connection to the intelligibles;42 2) what he is doing is better than 
the popular, vulgar prophecy of  religion anyway;43 3) he is an elitist.
Avicenna has a style a bit like the Greek commentators: a rather 
cryptic, oracular, enigmatic utterance followed by some more mundane 
explanation. Alexander , Ammonius and Themistius have similar styles. 
Or, perhaps better, we may compare the writing style of  Avicenna to that 
of  Plotinus . In both cases too we might wonder how well the text was 
corrected and proofed. Likewise, in both cases it is hard to distinguish 
when the author is presenting a position given by somebody else and 
its implications from when he is giving his own position; to determine 
when a question ends and its answer begins. 
Moreover, Avicenna’s cavalier attitude towards his own writings does 
not help the quality of  the text that we have. He generally would write 
extremely quickly. His own account has him writing fi fty pages per day 
of  the metaphysics and physics of  Aš-Šhifā.44 After writing something, 
he would give the copy to whom it was promised, or put it away for 
showing to the worthy few. Often, due to his frequent moves and the 
religious and political turmoil, his writings were lost or damaged.45 
41 Discussed and supported more in the Introduction to my translation of  Al-
Maqūlāt.
42 Fī Nafs 212,4–9. Cf. Gutas , Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, pp. 161 n. 30; 175. 
43 Like al-Fārābī , Avicenna held that religious customs for the common people 
differ from those for the elite philosophers. For instance, for Avicenna prayer had as 
its goal the fi nding of  middle terms; drinking wine is forbidden to the people but 
good for those of  “powerful brains.” Cf. The Life of  Ibn Sina, 28,2–5; 54,7–9; Al-Qānūn 
I.169.26–9. For a spirited discussion of  this issue, cf. Gutas , Avicenna and the Aristotelian 
Tradition, pp. 181–8.
44 The Life of  Ibn Sina, 58,2–8. 
45 Al-Jūzjānī , “Introduction” to Aš-Šhifā, §2, trans. Gutas , Avicenna and the Aristotelian 
Tradition, p. 40: “I have heard, however, that these were widely dispersed in that people 
who owned a copy of  them withheld them [from others]; as for him, it was not his 
habit to save a copy for himself, just as it was not his habit to make a copy from his 
archetype or transcribe [an archetype] from his rough draft: he would only either 
dictate or himself  write the manuscript and give it to the person who had commis-
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Consequently, we have the situation that Avicenna probably proofread 
little, and what copies there were were made haphazardly under hasty 
circumstances. Aside from the contingencies of  the political turmoil, 
we can see here perhaps echoes of  Plato ’s attitude toward written 
philosophy as expressed in his “Seventh Letter.” Written philosophy is 
dead philosophy, relics to be discarded as trinkets for those allowed to 
be souvenir hunters. 
Again, Avicenna was a Persian, and not a native Arabic speaker or 
writer. At any rate, let me say that he is quite careless about the ante-
cedents for his pronouns! I should also remark that at points we have 
some possible wordplay.46
Apart from these reasons—the haste of  composition, the state of  the 
manuscript, these elitist tendencies, possible language problems—there 
are other reasons why reading Avicenna is diffi cult. To be sure, Avicenna 
can write clearly. Yet often he writes quite obscurely, regardless of  the 
language in which the text is read. Perhaps this obscurity comes in part 
from Avicenna’s trying to say something new, for which there would 
not naturally lie ready to hand extant phrasing. We can see similar 
obscurities in many original works: Abelard —or Aristotle himself—is 
a good example. 
Above all, in reading works like Aš-Šhifā, we have the problem of  
context. Avicenna is reacting not only to Aristotle’s text but also to the 
other writings on it—commentaries, notes, marginalia, some of  which 
surrounded the Arabic translation that he was using. Avicenna was 
probably using some revised version of  Æunayn Isāq ’s translation, 
the standard Arabic one of  the time, with lots of  marginalia.47 Avicenna 
himself  says about his studies in his youth that resulted in the more 
sioned it from him. Moreover, he suffered from successive misfortunes, and disasters 
destroyed his books.” 
46 E.g., at Al-Maqūlāt 248,17–8.
47 F. E. Peters , Aristotle and the Arabs (New York, 1968), pp. 59–63; 160. It seems clear 
that, at least in some cases, Avicenna was not following Isāq’s translation (edited by 
Badawi, the eleventh century one with marginalia at the Bibliothèque Nationale of  
Paris) closely. Cf. Aristotle’s Categories 1a24–5, discussed in Al-Maqūlāt 28,4ff  with the 
current Oxford translation: “By ‘in a subject’ I mean what is in something, not as a 
part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.” If  Avicenna is quoting and not 
paraphrasing loosely, he is not using Isāq’s translation. Again, cf. Al-Maqūlāt 28,4–5: 
the terminology for the category of  having is not the same as Isāq’s either. Likewise, 
at 57,19, the translation for the Greek “boxer”: Isāq’s translation has ‘boxer’; Avicenna 
has ‘wrestler’. However, Porphyry , in Cat. 135, 9–11, has the example of  the wrestler as 
well as that of  the boxer, and it is true that wrestling was and is far more prominent 
in Islamic cultures than boxing.
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textual commentaries, now lost: “Then I began to read the books [of  
the Organon] by myself  and consult the commentaries until I had mas-
tered logic.”48 So he had read some commentaries, more than marginal 
notes. At this point, we can make only educated guesses about what 
commentaries Avicenna used. For Avicenna hardly ever cites any oth-
ers by name. Morevoer, he need not have read those whom he does 
mention. Likewise, when al-Fārābī names Archytas [of  Tarentum], 
he probably picked this name up from Simplicius .49 As for Al-Maqūlāt, 
the Greek commentaries on the Categories by Porphyry, Simplicius, 
Ammonius, Philoponus, and likewise Plotinus (especially Enneads VI ), 
insofar as they were translated into Arabic, are plausible candidates for 
Avicenna’s sources, at least indirectly.50 By the time of  Avicenna, there 
were also very many Islamic commentators and glossers, most of  which 
have not been studied carefully yet.51 By his own testimony, Avicenna 
considered the commentaries of  al-Fārābī the most important of  these.52 
48 Avicenna , Autobiography §5.
49 al-Fārābī, Greater Commentary on De interpretatione, eds. W. Kutsch and S. Morrow 
(Beirut, 1960), 157, 19–20; trans. F. W. Zimmermann (London, 1981), p. 152. Cf. 
Simplicius , in Cat. 86,28–30; 206,20; 408,11–2; 409,1–5. Archytas was a Pythagorean 
contemporary of  Plato; the commentary on the Categories is presently thought to be a 
fi rst-century (A.D.) forgery. Cf. T. A. Szlezák , Pseudo-Archytas über die Kategorien (Berlin, 
1972). 
50 Gerhard Endress , “Die wissenschaftliche Litteratur,” in Grundrisse der Arabischen 
Philologie, ed. H. Gätje , vol. 2 (Wiesbaden, 1987), pp. 416–31; Julius Weinberg , Abstraction, 
Relation and Induction (Madison, 1965), p. 91. On Greek texts available to Avicenna 
and not preserved today, see A. Badawī , La transmission de la philosophie grecque au monde 
arabe (Paris, 1968); “New Philosophical Texts Lost in Greek and Preserved in Islamic 
Translations,” in Islamic Philosophical Theology, ed. P. Morewedge (Albany, 1979), pp. 
3–13; H.-J. Ruland , Die arabischen Fassungen zweier Schriften des Alexander von Aphrodisias: 
Über die Vorsehung und Über das liberum arbitrium, diss. Saarbrücken 1976; “Zwei arabischen 
Fassungen der Abhandlung des Alexander von Aphrodisias über die universalia,” Nachr. 
der Akademie der Wiss. In Göttingen, 1979 no. 10. Again, Porphyry ’s lost commentary 
Ad Gedalium, was probably available at the time of  Avicenna. Cf. Michael Chase , ed. 
& trans., Simplicius : On Aristotle’s Categories 1–4 (Ithaca, 2003), p. 96.
51 The number of  these works is staggering. On those on the Categories, cf. F. E. 
Peters , Aristoteles Arabus (Leiden, 1968), pp, 7–11; H. Daiber , “Review of  Peters,” Aristoteles 
Arabus, Gnomon 42 (1970), p. 542; Gerhard Endress , “Die wissenschaftliche Litteratur,” 
in Grundrisse der Arabischen Philologie, vol. 2 (Wiesbaden, 1987), pp. 402–34; Gutas , Greek 
Thought, Arabic Culture, p. 151. For secondary literature and more updates see Grundrisse 
der Arabischen Philologie, ed. H. Gätje , vol. 2, pp. 481–502.
52 “Letter to Kiyā,” in Aristū {inda l-{Arab, ed. Badawī (Cairo, 1947), 120,9–122,8, 
§3, trans. Gutas , Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, p. 64: “At the present moment it 
is impossible for me [to rewrite it]: I do not have the free time for it, but am occupied 
with men like Alexander [of  Aphrodisias], Themistius , John Philoponus , and their 
likes. As for al-Fārābī , he ought to be very highly thought of, and not to be weighed 
in the same skill with the rest: he is all but the most excellent of  our predecessors.” 
Re al-Fārābī on the Categories, we have chiefl y (extant today) al-Fārābī’s epitome on 
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In sum, on current estimates, the commentaries that Avicenna used 
most are those by Simplicius and al-Fārābī.53 Given Avicenna’s choice 
of  issues, I suggest adding Porphyry to the list; Avicenna would have 
known of  Porphyry’s views on homonymy at least indirectly via their 
presentation in Simplicius.54
Consequently, the text of  Aš-Šhifā is not self-contained. Avicenna is 
often replying to arguments and doctrines that he does not state fully. 
Many of  these arguments can be found in the Greek commentaries 
or in later Islamic ones. However, we do not yet have many accessible 
editions or translations of  the commentaries written in Arabic, even 
by such as those by al-Fārābī . 
Moreover, Avicenna uses a technical vocabulary, inherited from 
the Greek traditions and his Islamic predecessors. This appears most 
clearly at fi rst glance in his use of  various prepositions which seems to 
fl out or at least stretch ordinary Arabic usage. Aristotle himself  in the 
Categories and Simplicius even more in his commentary on it did the 
same with Greek.55 Avicenna continues this tradition by making up 
terms or transforming the meaning of  existing terms in order to express 
his own theory.56 For Avicenna also is engaged in constructing his own 
the Categories (Al-Man¢iq {inda l-Fārabī, ed. R. Al-Ǧam, vol. 3 (Beirut, 1986); trans. 
as “al- Fārabī’s Paraphrase of  The Categories of  Aristotle,” Islamic Quarterly (1957), 
158–97, and more original discussions in the Kitāb al-Æurūf, ed. M. Mahdi (Beirut, 1970) 
and Kitāb al-Alfāz al-Musta{mala fī l-mantiq, ed. M. Mahdi (Beirut, 1968). See Gerhard 
Endress, “Die wissenschaftliche Litteratur,” in Grundrisse der Arabischen Philologie, vol. 3 
(Wiesbaden, 1992), p. 53, nn. 185–7.
53 Ilsetraut Hadot, “La vie et oeuvre de Simplicius d’après des sources grecques et 
arabes,” in Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie, ed. I. Hadot (Paris, 1987), p. 36; Gutas, 
Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, p. 150; Michael Chase , ed. & trans., Simplicius: On 
Aristotle’s Categories 1–4 (Ithaca, 2003), pp. 2–3. In regard to the Al-Maqūlāt proper, it is 
suggestive that, like Ammonius but unlike Simplicius, Avicenna does not discuss chapter 
15 on “having”, although Avicenna might have omitted this on his own initiative. Also, 
like Philoponus, in Cat., 126,9, Avicenna discusses the Resurrection example, and so 
maybe Avicenna is following him at 153,15ff.
54 Concetta Luna , “Commentaire,” pp. 65; 82. In addition to the extant commentary 
in Cat. in the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca and translated by S. Strange (Ithaca, 1992), 
there is a lost commentary Ad Gedalium, probably available at the time of  Avicenna. 
Cf. M. Chase , Simplicius , p. 96.
55 Cf. Richard Gaskin , trans. & comm., Simplicius , On Aristotle’s Categories 9–15 (Ithaca, 
2000), n. 628.
56 Cf. Gutas , Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, p. 10. Afnan , Philosophical Terminology 
in Arabic and Persian, p. 33, says, wrongly, “A signifi cant feature which was not of  the 
language but which cramped philosophical vocabulary in general and fossilized it almost 
permanently, was the lack of  initiative on the part of  the Falāsifah to coin special terms 
of  their own.” But then he is following Atkinson’s The Greek Language, which says the 
same about Aristotle and Greek!
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technical vocabulary for Greek technical expressions in Arabic. He uses 
some already made up, say by al-Fārābī . Still, he seems to be making 
up more himself, especially as his theory differs from earlier ones.57
In sum, Avicenna is not writing a commentary of  the usual sort. Like 
his later works, we can say of  those in the Šhifā that they contain many 
“Doubts about Aristotle”—although, to be sure, Avicenna also accepts 
much of  what Aristotle and earlier Aristotelians said.58 He is writing a 
commentary in the sense of  following the order of  Aristotle’s texts and 
commenting on what is being discussed. He often does not bother to 
explicate Aristotle’s text. Rather, he presents what he thinks on these 
topics. Although he does often agree with Aristotle, often he does not: 
for instance, in Al-Maqūlāt he disagrees with Aristotle in the Categories 
on homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy, on the ontological square, 
and on the number of  categories. Still, many of  the doctrines used by 
Avicenna to correct the doctrine of  the categories can indeed be found 
in Aristotle’s works elsewhere. I have given some examples above. 
We can fi nd analogous “commentaries” in Abelard . His Glosses on 
Porphyry are hardly glosses; his commentaries on Boethius stray so far 
from the texts that we look in vain in Boethius for most of  the doctrines 
Abelard puts forward. Like Abelard, Avicenna uses the text as a source 
of  questions, topics, and problems that he then investigates and for 
which he provides the answers. Avicenna does indeed seem to have a 
style much like Abelard’s: always looking for alternatives, contemptu-
ously dismissing views that he fi nds silly (here more with the verve of  
Roger Bacon ). Avicenna differs from Abelard perhaps in having his 
own, fi nal defi nite position on most issues.
The Case of  Categories 1
What Avicenna does in his discussion of  homonymy gives a good 
instance of  his approach. In effect, he takes the materials from the Greek 
period and offers a new theory, perhaps with a wider compass than what 
57 Cf. Shukri Abed , “Language,” in History of  Islamic Philosophy, eds. S. Nasr & O. 
Leaman (London, 1996), pp. 904–13.
58 Gutas , Greek Thought, Arabic Culture, p. 153. Cf. Dag Hasse , Avicenna ’s De Anima 
in the Latin West (London, 2000), p. vii: “different stages in a continuous process of  
reworking his position with the Peripatetic tradition and eventually emancipating 
himself  from it.”
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we fi nd in the (extant) Greek commentaries. For the Greek commenta-
tors tend to relegate parts of  their discussion to different passages: the 
materials about rhetorical, dialectical, and fallacious homonymies do 
not appear much in the Categories commentary. In contrast, Avicenna 
incorporates their doctrines into a general theory of  homonymy. He 
has a continuum, ranging from the merely ambiguous to the completely 
synonymous. 
Just what did Avicenna get from al-Fārābī’s  discussions of  the 
Categories? If  we look at his extant works, we do not fi nd much origi-
nal doctrine. Moreover, Avicenna does not follow al-Fārābī, e.g., in 
discussing the category of  having.59 Perhaps what he found important 
in al-Fārābī’s work was his method. For al-Fārābī  does not follow the 
order of  the text of  Aristotle, even in his so-called Paraphrase. Instead, 
he gathers Aristotle’s doctrines and writes a treatise with a clear, original 
organization.60 So perhaps Avicenna got from al-Fārābī a new approach. 
This would fi t with his remark that he did not understand Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics until he had read al-Fārābī’s work on it: that is, he did not 
understand the overall plan and structure of  the Metaphysics.61
Along these lines, Avicenna begins his commentary on the text of  
the Categories not with homonymy as Aristotle and all the Greek com-
mentators did, but with synonymy—presumably because synonymy is 
for science while homonymy is for sophistry. It is worth noting that in 
his later works like Al-Najāt and the Ishārāt Avicenna does not discuss 
homonymy at all, although he does discuss some other topics discussed 
in the Categories. 
Moreover, al-Fārābī, like the Arabic translation of  Isāq [e.g., at Cat. 1 
line 5], speaks of  expressions in terms of  having the same or different 
senses.62 He also will speak of  the essences themselves in terms of  their 
being the same or different in their senses.63 Such statements may well 
have suggested to Avicenna a general structure for homonymy based on 
senses. At any rate, as we shall now see, he does have such a scheme. 
59 al-Fārābī, in his Paraphrase of  the Categories of  Aristotle ed. & trans. D. M. Dunlop, 
Islamic Quarterly 5.1 (1959), 24,7–15 [trans. p. 40 §36], comments on the category of  
having and even distinguishes two types: a natural having, as a tree has its bark, and 
a voluntary having, as a man has his clothes.
60 Likewise in Kitāb al-Æurūf, where he presents some of  the doctrine of  the Categories, 
al-Fārābī uses his own organization of  the materials.
61 Autobiography §9. So too Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, p. 239.
62 Kitāb al-Æurūf §81 110,20–1.
63 In Kitāb al-Æurūf §89 117, 8–10.
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In order to understand Avicenna’s text and to see just how he differs 
from the earlier commentators, I shall fi rst discuss their doctrines.
The Greek commentators on Categories 1 all presented the same basic 
interpretation of  homonymy with some variations. From the view-
point of  Aristotle’s text, they provide too much commentary. For they 
develop, or augment, the few lines devoted to homonyms into a full-
blown theory of  homonymy incorporating many of  Aristotle’s doctrines 
found elsewhere. By comparison, their commentaries on synonymy and 
paronymy are much shorter. 
The Greek commentators worry a lot over the subject to be discussed 
in the Categories. They have various answers, ranging from beings qua 
beings, to thought, to predicables, to predications, to signifi cative expres-
sions, to expressions qua expressions. [Simplicius , in Cat.9,4ff.; Porphyry, 
in Cat. 59,10–33] Simplicius reports that Alexander of  Aphrodisias 
proposed that it deals with thoughts. [10,11–9; 9,31–10,2] In contrast 
Porphyry, in both his extant commentary and in his lost commentary 
to Gedalius, says that it is about predicates, sc., about expressions 
signifying things. [57,6; 58,6–10 & 18–20; Simplicius, in Cat. 10,20–3] 
Simplicius ends up concluding that the Categories deals with signifi ca-
tive expressions, but claims that this amounts to dealing with thoughts 
insofar as they signify. [10,4–5; 11,12; 12,1–4; 13,11–5; 21,7–9] At one 
point he likens these thoughts to the Stoic concepts, presumably the 
lekta. [10,2–4] As Aristotle holds at the beginning of  On Interpretation 
that thoughts constitute a mental language that the spoken language 
directly, and the written language indirectly, signify, we can see why he 
would think these two positions equivalent. Aristotle seems to speak of  
words and propositions signifying defi nitions and “meanings” on this 
basis. [ E.g., An. Po. 93b29–35]64 
They all then proceed to divide up these items, the signifi cative 
thoughts, let’s call them, into those that signify homonyms and those 
that signify synonyms.65
They fi nd this division exhaustive for the mental language. They add 
polynyms and heteronyms to the homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms 
64 David Charles , “Aristotle on Names and their Signifi cation,” in Language, ed. S. Everson 
(Cambridge, 1994), p. 43.
65 In addition to those discussed below, there are also classifi cations by Boethius, 
in Cat. 166B-C, who follows Simplicius , and variant ones by Olympiodorus, in Cat. 
34,3–35; David Elias, in Cat. 139,29–140,25; Sophonias , in Cat. 1,24–2,17. All these 
seem to have had no infl uence on Avicenna.
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discussed explicitly by Aristotle to account for features peculiar to the 
spoken or written language. Polynyms have the same account but 
different names, like two mantles with respect to ‘cloak’ and ‘cape’. 
Heteronyms have neither the name nor the account in common, as a 
crow is named ‘crow’ while a dog is named ‘dog’. Simplicius dis-
tinguishes such cases, which he calls “merely other names”, from 
heteronyms proper, which have a common substratum. [22,30–1] In 
this sense, there is a single thing, say, a stair or a mountain, with two 
names, ‘ascent’ and ‘descent’. [23,31–3]66 Simplicius gives two reasons 
why Aristotle does not discuss polynyms and heteronyms explicitly in 
Categories 1: either he found them obvious or he relegated their discus-
sion to his rhetorical and poetical works. [23,6–19; cf. 36,25–31] 
Porphyry presents a classifi cation of  homonyms given also by many 
other commentators. [in Cat. 65,18–66,21] Homonyms are: I) by chance, 
as ‘Alexander’ names both the son of  Priam and the son of  Philip; II) 
by intent, either 1) by similarity, as a man and a picture of  a man are 
both named by ‘animal’, or 2) by analogy, as the term ‘ἀρχή’ (‘principle’ 
or ‘beginning’) can be applied to numbers and lines and rivers, or 3) 
from something (ἀφ’ ἑνός), as different items can be called medical as 
their names are all said from ‘medicine’ according to different accounts, 
or 4) relative to something (πρὸς ἔν), as things that are called healthy 
as said relative to health. He notes that some put what is from or rela-
tive to something as intermediate between homonymy and synonymy. 
[6615–21] This would include, for instance, Alexander, where he locates 
focal meaning between homonymy taken in a narrow sense and syn-
onymy. [in Metaph. 241,3–24]67 Also Porphyry discusses the example of  
the foot of  a bed or a mountain. He says that some, like Atticus, take 
this to come about by metaphor from the foot of  an animal.68 However 
he classifi es it as homonymous by analogy. [66,34–67,32]
Simplicius gives the same classifi cation and examples as Porphyry. 
[31,22–32,11] He adds only the remark that some combine II.3 & II.4 
into a single type. [32,12–3] Still, given Aristotle’s discussion of  the two 
examples in Metaphysics IV and the connection between paronymy and 
66 Also cf. Clement of  Alexandria, Stromateis VIII.8.24.2–9, ed. Stählin, p. 95,5–26; 
Ammonius, in Cat. 16,24–17,3; Alexander, in Top. V,4 398,1–4; Luna “Commentaire,” 
p. 52.
67 Also Porphyry, in Cat. 66,18; Syrianus , in Met. 57,18–20.
68 Hans Wagner , “Über das Aristotelische ‘pollachos legetai to on’,” Kantstudien 53 
(1962), 75–91, p. 75, observes that analogy became the main focus of  discussions of  
homonymy in Latin medieval philosophy.
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focal meaning discussed above, it is hard to see why the two types should 
be distinguished in the fi rst place. To be sure, the ‘medical’ example 
concerns things used in the service of  medicine, and so concerns the 
effi cient or productive cause, while the health example concerns things 
for the sake of  health and so concerns the fi nal cause. Yet these differ-
ences look material and not formal. Perhaps we can fi nd examples of  
focal meaning that do not involve paronymy. Of  course, we could fi nd 
terms having focal meaning that are not derived from a common base, 
like Aristotle’s own example of  ‘excellence’ [Cat. 10b5–9], but then we 
would not have homonymy but some sort of  heteronymy. 
Following Alexander, Simplicius says that homonymy can hold 
between things under the same genus, like ‘equal’ for continuous and 
for discrete quanta, or between things under different genera, like 
‘equal’ for quanta and for relata. [in Phys. 403,13–19] He is insisting on 
its being possible for homonyms to be in the same genus, as Aristotle 
says, for instance, that, when differentiae are in different species, there is 
homonymy. [Part. An. 643a1–7] This distinction might be correlated 
with a narrow and a broad conception of  homonymy. Simplicius says 
also that a triangle and triangularity are homonyms with respect to 
‘triangle’. [Simplicius, in Cat. 264,7–10]69 However this position seems 
to come from his Platonist insistence that material triangles, not being 
perfect triangles, can be triangles in name only.70
Ammonius however gives a more elaborate classifi cation. [in Cat. 
21,16–22,10] Once again, homonyms are either I) by chance or II) by 
intention 1) “Some are homonyms of  one another and paronyms of  
what they are called after”71 a) from the effi cient cause, as what is said 
‘from something’, as with ‘medical’ b) from the fi nal cause, as what is 
said relative to something, as with ‘healthy’ 2) “Others are homonyms of  
one another and also homonyms of  what they are called after”, where 
the two things a) differ in the times where they have the name i) when 
one thing is named in memory of  the other, earlier one, like calling a 
child by the name of  his father or teacher ii) when two have the same 
name by chance iii) when the later one is named in the hope that it will 
have attributes of  the earlier thing, like naming someone today ‘Plato’ 
69 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads VI.3.2.2–4; also VI.II.1.
70 Michel Narcy , “L’homonymie entre Aristote et ses commentateurs néoplatoniciens,” 
Les Études Philosophiques 1 (1981), 35–52, p. 47. S. Marc Cohen and G. Matthews, 
trans. & comm., Ammonius: On Aristotle’s Categories (Ithaca, 1991), n. 42, claim that this 
is Platonist. 
71 Trans. S. Marc Cohen and G. Matthews, p. 30.
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b) do not differ in the times where they have the name, and are named 
i) by the similarity of  the objects, as when the wise ( phronimos) man is 
called wisdom ( phronesis) ii) by participation, like ‘musical’ in musical 
woman and musical knowledge iii) by analogy, like ‘good’ applied to 
the bed and to the mountain aa) in virtue of  similarity, as Gorgias and 
the river both have the name ‘Gorgias’, from moving rapidly bb) from the 
similarity of  the shape cc) by metaphor, like the feet and crown of  a 
mountain. Ammonius does not give many details, and may have run 
together different classifi cations into one.
Philoponus follows Ammonius somewhat, perhaps because his “com-
mentary” was, it seems, his notes on Ammonius. Be that as it may, he 
offers two divisions.
The fi rst one is: homonymy either I) by chance II) by intention 1) by 
memory 2) in hope 3) by analogy, as ‘foot’ for an animal and a hill 4) 
from something, like medical i) from a cause as a paradigm (—i.e., the 
formal cause?) as a picture of  a man is called a man from the name 
‘man’ being applied to the man ii) from the effi cient cause, as a scalpel 
is called healthy 5) relative to one, like ‘healthy’ [and perhaps 6) not 
by proportion, namely, perhaps. a proportion suitable for making an 
analogy]. [in Cat. 16,22–17,10] 
The second one is: homonymy is either I) by chance II) by inten-
tion 1) where one of  the homonyms is named paronymously from the 
other a) from the effi cient cause, as with ‘medical’ b) from the fi nal 
cause, as with ‘healthy’ 2) where one of  the homonyms is not named 
paronymously from the other when one thing is named in memory of  
the other earlier one. [21,14–22,11] This second classifi cation resembles 
Ammonius’ one, but seems less organized, as Philoponus goes on to 
observe that the ‘from something’ and the ‘relative to something’ can 
be simultaneous or not, and that the ‘from something’ can be based on 
similarity or on the second having the shape of  the fi rst, as the picture 
has the shape of  the man in the pictured and so both are called ‘man’. 
He also lists the difference of  being said in hope or in memory. What we 
have here is basically Ammonius’ scheme, a bit more disorganized with 
a few other distinctions already made appended perhaps in haste. 
Whatever its nuances, the interpretation of  Simplicius et al. makes 
homonymy more a matter of  the relationship between concepts about 
things, than about the things themselves.72 Perhaps in this he has 
72 Concetta Luna , “Commentaire,” p. 41: “. . . une interpretation “conceptualiste” 
de l’homonymie: pour Simplicius , l’homonymie consiste dans le rapport entre un seul 
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become more Platonist, as Plato saw homonymy as more a matter of  
different beliefs people have about things than a doctrine about things 
and their names.73
I shall now make some remarks useful for understanding these clas-
sifi cations and Avicenna’s use of  them.
In surveying the corpus of  Aristotle, the Greek commentators found 
a broad and a narrow conception of  homonymy. Sometimes Aristotle 
calls any things said in many ways homonyms. Other times he distin-
guishes homonyms from things said to be relative to something. Some 
beings do not have the merely accidental unity of  a name, but a real 
unity, suffi cient to ground a science of  being qua being as Alexander 
notes. In contrast to this scientifi c use of  a sort of  homonymy, Aristotle 
also names a fallacy one of  “homonymy”.
Still, on account of  Aristotle’s general use of  ‘homonymy’, the 
commentators had reason to see how all these more particular ways 
in which things are said in many ways could fi t into a general scheme 
of  homonymy.
However, they tended to leave out, or at least deemphasize, some 
cases of  homonymy from their general classifi cation: analogy, metaphor, 
and the homonymy of  the fallacy [which we might call, following 
Avicenna et al. ‘ambiguity’]. Accordingly, they explain that Aristotle 
did not discuss metaphor and analogy, and likewise heteronymy and 
polynymy, in the Categories as he relegated these topics to rhetorical 
and poetical works. 
In some of  these classifi cations of  homonymy we see the appear-
ance of  paronymy. Simplicius even goes so far as to make paronymy 
intermediate between synonymy and homonymy. [in Cat. 37,3–4] No 
one gives a full explanation why, but we can construct one.74 Accept 
mot et une multiplicité de répresentations mentales produites par ce mot, plûtot que 
dans le rapport entre un seul mot et une multiplicité de choses.”
73 Concetta Luna , “Commentaire,” pp. 56–7: “Comme l’a souligné J. P. Anton , la 
différence d’approche du problems de l’homonymie, entre Aristote et Platon, consists 
en ce que pour Platon l’homonymie est une question d’opinions différentes (ce qui est 
cohérent avec la conception platonicienne de la philosophie comme dialogue), tandis que 
pour Aristote les ambiguités qu’il faut lever ne sont pas celles des opinions: le problème 
naît uniquement parce que certaines réalités ont Ie même nom que d’autres.” Cf. 
J. P. Anton, “The Aristotelian Doctrine of  Homonymy in the Categories and its Platonic 
Antecedents,” Journal of  the History of  Philosophy 6 (1968), 315–326, p. 317.
74 This is the charitable interpretation. The other leading candidate is that they con-
fused in what ways the ‘relative to something’ and the ‘from something’ are related.
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Aristotle’s doctrine of  focal meaning. Then there will be things having 
different defi nitions yet having the same name derived from the focal 
one. E.g., walking and having a temperature of  98°F are both called 
“healthy”, a name derived from the name ‘health’.75 (Note that their 
having the same name is a feature accidental to particular natural lan-
guages, like English and Greek. Indeed Arabic with its more complex 
verbal system would tend to use different forms for names for ‘being 
productive of  health’ and ‘being a sign of  health’.)76 Here then we have 
a case of  two things sharing the same name yet differing in account. 
So they are homonyms. Yet each of  them is also a paronym relative 
to health. On this interpretation, health, the state itself, would not be 
a homonym relative to one of  the things called “healthy”. 
Ammonius’ classifi cation, despite being expressed unclearly, falls along 
these lines. Some homonyms have a paronymous name in common; 
others do not. Thus Philoponus says, “for it (medical) is named par-
onymously from it (medicine), while [holding] homonymously to each 
other.” [in Cat. 21,201; cf  Simplicius , in Cat. 264,7–10]77 However, his 
use of  ‘from something’ and ‘relative to something’ would be rather 
careless. For all homonyms having a paronymous name are said “from 
something”. But then Ammonius goes on to subdivide these two into 
those having things named from the effi cient cause, as being produc-
tive of, say, health, and into those having things named from the fi nal 
cause, as for the sake of  health. The problem is that he describes the 
former as “from something” and the latter as “relative to something”. 
Yet these expressions also describe the structure common to all such 
paronyms. Ammonius himself  admits that some combine these two 
types [in Cat. 21,21–2]. 
75 Cf. Philoponus, in Cat. 15,7–10, although he is discussing names for things and 
for their essence.
76 As Avicenna himself  notes at Al-Maqūlāt, eds. G. Anawati, A. El-Ehwani, M. El-
Khodeiri, & S. Zayed (Cairo, 1959) (Part One, Volume Two of  Aš-Šhifā) 16,12–17,14; 
Al-{Ibāra, ed. M. Al-Khudayri (Cairo, 1970), (Part One, Volume Three of  Aš-Šhifā) 
19,16–21,6. He is following al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-Æurūf, ed. M. Mahdi (Beirut, 1969), e.g., 
§§19–20, 71,2–15. On the structure of  paronymy in Arabic see W. Wright , A Grammar 
of  the Arabic Language (Cambridge, 1967), Vol. I §195; Wolfdietrich Fischer , A Grammar 
of  Classical Arabic, 3rd ed. trans. J. Rodgers (New Haven, 2002) p. 35.
77 Concetta Luna , “Commentaire,” p. 149: “La langue grecque n’a pas deux termes 
pour désigner la triangularité et le triangle, comme elle en a deux pour designer la 
courbure . . . et ce qui est courbe . . . On dit donc “τρίγωνον” à la fois pour désigner la 
propriété d’être triangle . . . et pour désigner le triangle écrit sur le tableau ou fait en bois 
(le poion). Cette double signifi cation de “trigwnon” en fait un terme homonyme.” 
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The doctrines of  the Greek commentators passed into Islamic phi-
losophy, just as the late Greek commentators themselves were exiled 
from a Byzantine Christian court but then invited to establish a school 
by a Muslim caliph.78 Let us now see what Avicenna does with it.
Avicenna begins by discussing synonymy, whereas Aristotle starts 
Categories 1 with homonymy. The Greek commentators made a great 
defense of  Aristotle’s order of  presentation (Cf. Simplicius , in Cat. 
21,1–22,13). In contrast, Avicenna is rejecting it.
Avicenna holds that names have a relation to things via senses or 
concepts. We have seen some basis for such a conception of  senses in 
Aristotle and the Greek commentators, as well as in the Arabic transla-
tion of  the Categories and in al-Fārābī. There is also the Stoic concept 
of  the lekton, which seems quite a close relative of  Avicenna’s concep-
tion of  a sense (ma{nan). Aside from Stoic doctrines presented in the 
Greek commentators, it is hard to know what Stoic sources Avicenna 
had. Still, given his extensive treatment of  hypotheticals in his formal 
logic (in al-Qīyās), he seems to have had some. In any case, for him the 
conception of  a sense is fundamental. Also suggestive is the fact that 
Stoics tended not to distinguish synonymy and pluronymy, nor even 
heteronymy and homonymy.79 This tendency would encourage Avicenna 
to see homonymy, synonymy etc. lying on a continuum. 
Constructed on a conception of  the sense, Avicenna’s theory of  
homonymy is far simpler than those of  the Greek commentators. 
Seeing its simplicity depends on having a certain interpretation of  his 
conception of  similarity. What makes things similar but not the same? 
We may say: because they share some but not all features. This holds 
even in a metaphorical comparison. A woman may be likened to a rose 
with respect to beauty but not with respect to having thorns or needing 
pruning in the winter. So too senses may have some similarity or overlap 
but not be the same. Thus, when Avicenna distinguishes homonyms, 
he says that homonyms of  the second sort do not have the same sense 
but have a similarity. Now not having the same sense is compatible with 
having and with not having totally different senses. So we get cases like 
78 Gerhard Endress, “Die Wissenschaftliche Literatur,” in Grundrisse der Arabischen 
Philologie, ed. H. Gätje (Wiesbaden, 1987), vol. 2, pp. 402–5.
79 Cf. Simplicius , in Cat. 36,8–12. Concetta Luna , “Commentaire,” p. 115: “Dans 
l’usage stoicien, “synonyme” a donc la même signifi cation que “polyonyme” et, pour-
raît-on dire, il correspond tout à fait l’usage moderne de ce mot. Simplicius affi rme 
que l’usage aristotélicien est plus approprié . . .” Cf. C. Douglas McGee, “Who Means 
What by ‘Synonymy’?,” Inquiry 2 (1959), 199–212.
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similarity, such as Socrates and his picture both being named ‘man’. 
Avicenna will consider metaphors of  the same type, like the leg of  
an animal and a bed, and analogies, like the ‘archē’ of  number and 
line—apparently with analogy being a type of  metaphor.80 
Furthermore, it helps to view Avicenna’s classifi cation of  homonymy 
not as discrete but as continuous. In effect, he gives a continuum with 
one endpoint limiting the homonymous being the strictly synonymous 
and the other being the completely heteronomous (which he mentions at 
11,4, and at 15,16–16,3 along with polynyms), having neither a common 
name, account, or sense. Inside this continuum, within each type of  
homonymy, he will discuss cases that satisfy its description more or less 
so. Moreover, because having disjoint, discrete types does not concern 
him, he does not fuss much over the classifi cation but over the details 
of  the structure of  particular cases. So he has a continuum within his 
division, and perhaps implies this at Al-Maqūlāt 11,5–7; 14,6–15,15. 
But, for the sake of  reference, I shall divide up and number the sorts 
that he does discuss.
His classifi cation is threefold: 
It may be said that everything that is not by way of  agreement [synonymy] 
is by coincidence of  the name [homonymy], and has three divisions: that 
is because either [ I ] the sense is one in itself, even through it differs in 
another respect, or that [ II ] it is not one, but between the two of  them 
there is a similarity, or that [ III ] it is not one and there is also not a 
similarity between them.81
The fi rst division [ I ] contains things that are not strictly synonymous 
but share a single sense. In light of  the descriptions and examples, the 
fi rst division includes those things said by Aristotle and the commenta-
tors to be named either “from something” or “relative to something”.82 
[ II ] The second division concerns cases where the things being named 
have a real basis of  similarity for sharing the name, but not the same 
sense. From the examples, this type seems to include all cases based 
on a real resemblance, including metaphor, analogy, and similarity of  
appearance, like the example of  Socrates and his picture. [ III ] The 
third division concerns cases where the things share only the name.83 
80 Cf. Aristotle, Poetics 1457b6–16.
81 Al-Maqūlāt 10,4–7; all translations from this are mine.
82 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1030a32–b7; Nicomachean Ethics 1147b34–1148a2. 
83 A likely important source for this classifi cation is al-Fārābī’s Short Treatise On Aristotle’s 
De interpretatione, trans. Zimmermann (Oxford, 1981), pp. 49–52, pp. 227–30.
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Avicenna considers senses, the concepts in the mental language [cf. 
Int. 16a3–8], to exist in the mind via sense perception and abstraction. 
Such senses are given conventional names by imposition or stipulation 
in the written or spoken language. These senses differ from defi nitions 
or “accounts” (λόγοι) proper, as they contain all that is common to the 
individuals from which they are abstracted. Avicenna gives the example 
of  people living in the Sudan: from them we would have the sense or 
concept of  a human being as having black skin, even though the defi ni-
tion of  human being, grounded upon quiddities in themselves accessed 
via intuition (νοῦς) does not include that characteristic.84
I now discuss each type of  homonymy distinguished: 
[ I ] Given what he says at 11,5, Avicenna divides homonyms sharing 
a name and a single sense into A) the absolute and B) the relative. Both 
the absolute and the relative sorts concern things with focal meaning. 
Avicenna says about all these cases that the two things could have 
instead been named by different names or expressions—presumably 
synonymous ones. Even in the absolute cases, we could have said, 
more precisely, e.g., ‘being that is prior’ and ‘being that is posterior’. 
Hence, even though only the relative cases use paronymous names as 
commonly understood, even the absolute cases use names having a 
whiff  of  the paronymous.85 
[A] In the absolute sort, the name applies to the two things in the 
same sense. The name does not need a different sense when predicated 
of  each. Yet it will need a different “account”, or perhaps defi nition, 
if  the things are to avoid being synonyms. 
1. [10,8–11] ‘Existent’ (being; ὄν) can be applied to substances, quan-
tities etc. in the same sense and so is used absolutely.86 Quantities and 
substances exist in re in the same sense. Yet they do differ in terms of  
priority and posteriority and this, as Aristotle had said, eliminates strict 
synonymy.87 (Indeed Simplicius had brought up this issue later on in 
his Categories commentary. [418,19–419,6]) Also they differ in the sense 
that they have different modes of  existence or being: as a substance, 
as a quantity etc. This fi ts with Avicenna’s metaphysics where the 
84 Al-Burhān, ed. Badawi (Cairo, 1954), 46,11–6 et passim. Cf. Avicenna, Fī Al-Nafs, 
ed. G. Anawati (Cairo, 1962), II.2. I thank Claude Panaccio for instigating this para-
graph.
85 As in Porphyry’s distinction II.2 perhaps.
86 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1030a32–b7. 
87 Eudemian Ethics 1218a1–8.
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necessary being causes various quiddities to come to exist in re and to 
associate with other ones via acquiring differentiae and via some becom-
ing accidental to others.88 
2. [10,12–16] Avicenna also says that homonyms may have a name 
with the same sense and be simultaneous (being neither prior nor 
posterior), while differing in being primary and secondary. He gives 
no examples. I offer as possible candidates a triangle and an isosceles 
triangle both being named ‘triangle’ or being named ‘something hav-
ing its interior angles equal to two right angles’. As Aristotle had said, 
such names hold of  both triangle and the isosceles triangle, but of  the 
former primarily and of  the latter not so. [An. Po. I.5] 
3. [10,17–11,4] Other names keep the same sense and even the same 
account but differ in what they signify about the things they describe. 
Ivory and snow are not equally white. They are white understood on 
the same defi nition. Still ‘white’ when applied to ivory means ‘off-white’, 
let’s say, while, when applied to snow, it means ‘arctic white’. The Greek 
commentators do not mention this case.89 
Why does Avicenna say that such homonyms have the same sense? 
Apparently, he is thinking of  white as the genus, covering a range of  
whitish colors. These colors would be differentiated by specifi c differentiae 
like ‘off-’ and ‘arctic’ in the example above. They still share the same 
general, Aristotelian defi nition of  whiteness: standing out in sight.90 
Nevertheless, they are not precisely synonyms with respect to ‘white’ it 
seems. For they are more or less white, and so have the name hold of  
them in different degrees. They also fall under the priority condition 
given by Aristotle,91 like the fi rst two cases (IA.1 & 2). 
Avicenna also remarks, about this sort but presumably with general 
import, that in ordinary language names will be used imprecisely and 
their senses must be ascertained from the intention of  the speaker. 
Indeed Avicenna regularly distinguishes an ideal, technical language 
from the ordinary vernacular. Perhaps he is thinking here of  such cases 
as when ‘white’ is taken to describe varying colors of  human skin.92
88 See Allan Bäck, “The Triplex Status and its Justifi cation,” Studies in the History of  
Logic, eds. I. Angelelli & M. Cerrezo (Berlin, 1996).
89 Possibly: Nicomachean Ethics 1147b34–1148a2.
90 Cf. Ammonius, in Cat. 45,2; 40, 13–4.
91 Eudemian Ethics 1218a1–8.
92 See Allan Bäck, “The Ordinary Language Approach in Traditional Logic,” in 
Argumentationstheorie, ed. K. Jacobi (Leiden, 1993), pp. 507–30, pp. 511–2.
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[ B] [11,5–7] The relative sort concerns things having the same name 
said “relative to something” in Aristotle’s account of  focal meaning. In 
this case the shared sense does not come from the name common to 
the two homonyms but from the thing relative to which they have a 
relationship. Thus the knife and exercise may have a common, parony-
mous name, ‘medical’. ‘Medical’ however is defi ned differently when 
predicated of  the knife and exercise. The shared sense comes from the 
presence of  ‘medicine’ in the different defi nitions.
Avicenna differs fundamentally from the Greek commentators and 
perhaps from Aristotle himself  about what things he allows to share a 
single name in the same sense. He has a set of  examples of  names rang-
ing from ‘existent’ to ‘white’ and ‘philosophy’ to ‘medical’ and ‘healthy’ 
and ‘divine’. He says that some of  these names hold absolutely with 
different degrees of  priority, primacy, or participation, while others hold 
only relatively. The fundamental point lies in his claiming that cases like 
‘being’ and ‘medical’ have formal differences. Even Aristotle grouped 
these cases together in arguing for the unity of  a science of  being qua 
being. To put the point historically backwards, Avicenna has a position 
on transcendental terms more like Scotus’ than Aristotle’s. 
II. [11,8–12,7] The type where the sense of  the name is not one 
but the homonyms have a similarity is homonymy proper, in the nar-
row sense distinguished by Alexander. Avicenna runs together two 
examples commonly kept apart by the Greek commentators. (A) The 
fi rst is the basic one from Categories 1, where an animal and its picture 
are homonyms with respect to being named ‘animal’. (B) The second 
is the standard example of  a metaphor, of  a leg of  an animal and a 
leg of  a bed.93 Avicenna recognizes that the latter is a metaphor while 
the former is not. Still he observes that the metaphor was made on 
the basis of  a perceived similarity—and so he does not use the usual 
Arabic word for ‘metaphor’ but instead calls this “a transferred name”: 
we might call it a simile.94 In both cases the name is applied to one 
homonym primarily and to the other secondarily. 
He also remarks that some of  these homonyms are (C) fi xed by itself  
(or per se) while (D) others are based on a “relationship” (nisba). 
(C) The fi rst sort seems straightforward. The very attributes of  the 
two things involved fi x the similarity. Thus the form of  the animal and 
93 Poetics 1457b16–9; Rhetoric 1401a12–5.
94 Cf. Zimmermann, al-Fārābī’s  Commentary, p. 227, nn. 2–3.
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the form of  its picture are similar, and so are the shapes of  the legs of  
animals and tables because of  attributes of  the two things involved.
(D) The second sort is more cryptic. ‘Nisba’ can also mean ‘attribu-
tion’ or ‘proportion’. Avicenna seems to use it in a quasi-technical sense 
to signify a relationship between two things that does not fall into the 
category of  relation.95 From the Greek commentators we can see that 
the relationship here is analogy, which can be understood as a “pro-
portion”. The example of  ‘beginning’ (ἀρχή) is the standard one of  
analogy in Porphyry and Simplicius . 
Some of  the subdivisions of  the classifi cations given by the Greek 
commentators might apply to this second sort, as I will discuss below. For 
example, Avicenna mentions Ammonius’ distinction [I.2.i–iii] of  giving 
things a common name by chance, in memory, or in hope. [14,1–5] 
III. [11,8–13.14] In the third main type, the two things have only 
the name in common, with no shared sense or similarity. Avicenna 
does not include metaphor here when it has a real basis—the trans-
ferred name or simile. However, when ‘dog’ is applied to a star and 
an animal, in the example from the Rhetoric, Avicenna thinks that there 
is no real similarity between stars and dogs, but only a merely mental 
one.96 So Aristotle puts this example here. Paralogisms of  the fallacy 
of  homonymy would belong to this sort too.97 
Avicenna does offer the option that, if  such cases like the dog and 
the Dog star could be shown to have a real similarity, then they would 
belong to the second sort and be similes. [13,15–14,6] He uses the 
example of  the name {ayn applied to an eye and to cash. He gives an 
etymological way to connect them up so that they have a real similar-
ity, but seems to be ambivalent about whether or not there is indeed a 
real similarity. He distinguishes here the three causes for applying the 
name of  an eye ({ayn) to cash that Ammonius had given: coincidence, 
memory, and hope. [II.2ai–iii] For Avicenna these would suggest that 
the naming had no real similarity. Still, he can also apply his remark 
about ordinary language use and the intention of  the speaker 
here, so as to allow for a loose conception of  the second type (II). 
Avicenna settles on calling this third sort ‘ambiguity (taškīk). Thus, 
when discussing whether being is a genus for the ten categories or 
whether it is “said in many ways”, he says:
95 Nicomachean Ethics 1148b7–10. See too 67,2–3; 79,5; 85,10;145,17. Cf. al-Fārābī, 
Kitāb al-Æurūf §§37–40.
96 Aristotle, Phyiscs 249a19–25; Nicomachean Ethics 1147b34–1148a2.
97 Cf. Al-Safsa¢a, ed. A. Ehwany (Cairo, 1958), 45,5; 50,14.
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And the multiplication of  what is being talked about is in three modes: 
Either there is multiplication via agreement in its subjects, or a multipli-
cation via a coincidence in infl ection comprehending its similarity and 
participation [ homonymy], or a multiplication via ambiguity. [59,10–1] 
Apparently Avicenna means by “agreement in its subjects” here not 
synonymy (as ‘agreement’ normally means for him) but having the 
same sense. If  so, we have the focal-meaning type of  homonymy (I), 
homonymy in the narrow sense, the second type (II) of  homonymy, and 
ambiguity as its third type (III). Avicenna, being interested in science 
and not sophistry, would have little use in his own philosophy for this 
third sort, and so would separate it out. 
He distinguishes the second and third types of  homonymy in the 
same way at 14,6–15,15. He goes on to observe that they agree in 
not having the same account but using a single name. He then gives 
a somewhat confusing discussion of  the example where the name ‘leg’ 
is applied to both a bed and an animal. Above he said that this was a 
case of  the second type. Here he suggests a way that it might, alter-
natively, be taken of  the third type and be a case of  mere ambiguity. 
The main idea is that the things could have the similarity of  being 
three-dimensional bodies, but differ in being legs. For after all, Aristotle 
would say that a leg that is not alive is a leg only homonymously. 
[Part. An. 640b35–641a5; cf. Metaph. 1035b23–5; 1036b30–2] If  this 
were the only similarity between bed and animal legs—and not also 
being a support for the main bulk of  an object etc.—then ‘leg’ would 
indeed be used ambiguously. However the things being compared 
do seem to have such additional similarities. Thus the example looks 
contrived. It has the further problem that animal legs and bed legs are 
legs synonymously with respect to the name ‘body’—unless Avicenna 
is thinking of  making it an instance of  one of  the sorts of  the fi rst 
type of  homonymy (I). This entire discussion would then resemble the 
standard one in the Greek commentators about whether homonyms 
are synonyms: with respect to the name ‘homonym’ the things that are 
homonyms via another name are synonyms; with respect to that other 
name, they are homonyms.98 
(Avicenna also considers but rejects an argument appearing in the 
Sophistical Refutations [165a10–3] that homonymy is inevitable as there 
98 E.g., Simplicius , in Cat. 30,16–31,21. 
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are an infi nite number of  things but only a fi nite number of  words. 
This entire issue does not appear in the Greek commentators.)
In sum, Avicenna has a fi eld of  homonymy running the full spec-
trum of  the phenomena: the linguistic data and the endoxa, the texts of  
Aristotle and the others, and the reputable common ways of  talking. 
Strict synonymy, where the name has no change in infl ection and the 
defi nition, gives one endpoint or limit to the spectrum. The things hav-
ing the same name in the same sense but in different respects (I) lie on 
the boundary of  homonymy closest to that endpoint. Mere ambiguity, 
where it has just chanced in a particular language that the same sign, 
spoken and/or written, happens to be used for two different objects 
without any common ground, provides the other boundary. Heteronomy, 
where two different things have two different names, senses, and defi ni-
tions, provides the other endpoint or limit. Various changes of  meaning, 
along with the respective texts in the Aristotelian tradition, can be fi tted 
along the continuum of  this spectrum within those limits. 
Avicenna’s division of  homonymy does not match up with the stan-
dard one of  the Greek commentators. Take their main one: homonyms 
by chance or by intention. Some of  each of  these types will fall into 
his third type, where there is no overlap in sense or in similarity. The 
same word may chance to name two different sorts of  objects, like 
κλείς in Greek, {ayn in Arabic, and ‘bank’ in English, with no overlap. 
Yet likewise we can have such names intentionally: if  I call my child 
‘angel’ in hope that she will act like one, or my wastebasket ‘Dubya’ in 
memory of  a U.S. President. One might object that in the latter cases 
there is an imagined similarity. But for Avicenna such fancies are for 
sophists; an imagined similarity need not be a real one. 
Avicenna’s scheme for homonymy has the advantage over the earlier 
ones of  greater compass. He can include in it the fallacious, meta-
phorical, and ambiguous sort of  homonymy that were omitted or left 
to one side earlier. He also has a greater range of  texts from Aristotle, 
e.g., Sophistical Refutations 165a10–3, on the argument that homonymy 
is inevitable because things are infi nite while words are fi nite. 
Avicenna has a very complex terminology for ‘homonymy’. The 
homonymous he indicates by two expressions, not necessarily similar in 
his own theory: “participating” or “sharing” (ištirāk), on the one hand, 
and “coinciding” (ittifāq), on the other. The latter appears in Isāq’s 
translation of  Categories 1. The former comes from Arabic philology 
and was used by al-Fārābī,  who uses “participation in the name” when 
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speaking of  two senses of  ‘non-existent’.99 These two expressions have 
the common notion that the things share the name, or coincide or agree 
in it, but not in the defi nition. In addition Avicenna adds ‘ambiguous’ 
(mutašābih) and ‘equivocal’ (mušakuk) to the mix, each of  which might 
be used to signify homonymy. Many translators have ignored these 
differences and just translated most of  these expressions by ‘ambigu-
ous’ or ‘homonymous’.100 Yet Avicenna does take some pains to keep 
all these terms distinct. 
However, Avicenna perhaps has a technical usage for these differ-
ent expressions, obscured by such translations. (I have noted that the 
Revised Oxford translation of  Aristotle is not too precise either!) Now 
we have seen that the Greek commentators kept distinct various types 
of  homonymy often signifi ed by different expressions. Following their 
tradition, Avicenna distinguishes different types of  homonymy too. Does 
he have a systematic vocabulary?
In light of  Avicenna’s classifi cation of  homonymy, I suggest that 
Avicenna generally, albeit with exceptions, has the following usage: 
‘coincident’, following Isāq’s translation, signifies homonymy in 
general, and sometimes, in particular the narrow sort of  homonymy 
discussed in Categories 1, i.e., type II. Likewise ‘equivocal’ when modi-
fying ‘name’ would represent some sort of  homonymy, such that the 
two homonyms have two different defi nitions or accounts relative to 
that name.101 ‘Participating’ signifi es the fi rst type (I) of  homonymy, 
based on focal meaning, and ‘ambiguity’ the third type (III) dealing 
with poetry, rhetoric, and sophistry. Thus, for instance he contrasts 
synonymy, homonymy by participation, and ambiguity.102 So perhaps 
Avicenna has a systematic vocabulary as well as a systematic theory 
for homonymy. 
How does Avicenna’s classifi cation fare as an interpretation of  Aris-
totle? Above all, his theory seems to differ, as he uses senses as well as 
 99 Kitāb al-Æurūf 122,4; so too in Avicenna, Safsa¢a 45,5; 47,1 when discussing 
the fallacy of  homonymy. Cf. Zimmermann, al-Fārābī’s  Commentary and Short Treatise, 
p. 228 n.3. This use of  ‘participation’ may not be confusing Aristotle with Plato. Cf. 
Ammonius, in Cat. 22,2–10, on division of  homonymy, incl. participation. S. Marc 
Cohen and G. Matthews, trans. & comm. Ammonius: On Aristotle’s Categories (Ithaca, 
1991), n. 42, claim that this is Platonist. 
100 Goichon in her Lexique and the editors of  Al-Maqūlāt in their Index of  terms do 
give different translations for most but don’t explain the differences.
101 Cf. Al-Maqūlāt 11,5; 94,13.
102 Al-Maqūlāt 28,5–8.
newton_f4_31-72.indd   62 4/1/2008   7:45:00 PM
 avicenna the commentator 63
names and “accounts” (or defi nitions) in his analysis of  homonymy. 
Aristotle himself  does not mention “senses” in his account—unless we 
accept the new Owenite orthodoxy that homonymy deals with meanings. 
So it depends how strongly we take Aristotle’s claim that homonyms 
have only a name in common. [Cat. 1a3] 
Avicenna’s scheme fares better as giving a theory covering Aristotle’s 
uses and remarks on homonymy. The continuum gives a clear sense to 
Aristotle’s distinction between close and remote homonymy103 in terms 
of  being closer to or further away from having a relation of  synonymy. 
That is, we can think of  objects as having senses and then consider 
to what extent the senses overlap. For modern interpreters also have 
claimed that “the distinction between homonymy (complete difference 
in defi nitions) and synonymy (identity of  defi nitions) is not a dichotomy 
because defi nitions may be partially identical, partially different.”104 
Again, Hintikka also complains that Aristotle is not consistent in 
different passages in classifying analogical and metaphorical uses of  a 
word.105 Avicenna’s discussion about how metaphors can be taken as 
type II or III has some use here as he offers a way to put analogy and 
metaphor on a continuum.
We might compare Avicenna’s classifi cation of  homonymy with a 
modern one, given as an interpretation of  Aristotle. Christopher Shields , 
who also attributes senses and meanings to Aristotle, takes homonymy 
in general to be “comprehensive homonymy”, where the homonyms 
are “not completely overlapping in defi nition”.106 He divides compre-
hensive homonymy into the discrete and the associated.107 The discrete 
has no overlap in defi nition, while the associated does.108 Homonymy 
103 Aristotle, Physics 249a19–25; Nicomachean Ethics 1147b34–1148a2.
104 Hintikka. “Aristotle and the Ambiguity of  Ambiguity,” p. 141.
105 Ibid., p. 143.
106 Christopher Shields , Unity in Multiplicity (Oxford, 1999), p. 11. Cf. T. H. Irwin, 
“Homonymy in Aristotle,” Review of  Metaphysics 34 (1981), p. 255 on conneced 
and unconnected homonymy. Likewise, Hintikka. “Aristotle and the Ambiguity of  
Ambiguity,” p. 144: “We have to realize that the distinction between homonyms and 
terms with merely different applications often amounts to something rather different 
from distinction between complete and partial discrepancy of  defi nitions.”
107 Christopher Shields , Unity in Multiplicity, p. 29.
108 So too T. H. Irwin, “Homonymy in Aristotle,” p. 524, with “connected” and 
“disconnected” homonymy—i.e., Avicenna’s I & II versus III. He goes on, p. 528, 
to contrast homonymy where the term is predicated of  both things strictly, from the 
“spurious cases, where only one is, while the second has the predication based on 
similarity—i.e., Avicenna’s I versus II.
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of  focal meaning is one sort of  the associated, which Shields calls the 
core-dependent.109 He also divides the associated into the accidental 
and the non-accidental, which seems to include the core-dependent.110 
(He also distinguishes seductive and non-seductive homonymy, as well 
as homonymy based on shallow and deep differences in signifi cation, 
although he does not want these in his classifi cation proper.111 The 
former distinction contrasts homonymies easy to spot from those that 
are not; the latter does something similar by appealing to nominal 
versus real defi nitions.) 
In the terms of  the Greek commentators (whom he does not cite 
much) and Avicenna, Shield’s comprehensive is homonymy in the 
broad sense (I–III), the discrete is homonymy in the narrow sense (I & 
II), the associated is that of  the focal meaning sort (I), the accidental 
is homonymy by chance, and the non-accidental is homonymy by 
intention. So Avicenna does not have too different a classifi cation from 
Shield’s, except that his doctrine of  shared senses gives more precision 
to “overlap”, and his scheme gives Aristotelian philosophy more theo-
retical coherence. Indeed, if  we are to follow the “new” orthodoxy of  
attributing senses to Aristotle, we might as well become followers of  
Avicenna. Anthropological trope theory today uses a vertical dimension 
of  analogy similar to Avicenna’s continuum.112 Moreover, as for the 
contemporary treatment of  fallacy, if  Powers is right that all fallacies 
can be reduced to the fallacy of  equivocation, Avicenna’s classifi cation 
may offer a start to a comprehensive theory.113
There are some semblances of  scholarly and philological scholasticism, 
with regard to Aristotelian studies . . . but the hurricane of  Avicenna’s 
philosophy quickly swept such tendencies away.114 
Averroes as The Commentator?
The Aristotelian tradition may have slighted Avicenna as a com-
mentator on account of  Averroes being given canonical status as ‘the 
109 Christopher Shields , Unity in Multiplicity, pp. 37; 27.
110 Ibid., p. 29. 
111 Ibid., pp. 39–40; 101–2. Cf. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 182b25–7.
112 Paul Friedrich , “Polytropy,” in Beyond Metaphor, ed. J. Fernandez (Stanford, 1991), 
pp. 19–55, p. 40.
113 Lawrence Powers , “Equivocation,” in Fallacies, eds. H. Hansen & R. Pinto 
(University Park, 1995), pp. 293–301, p. 287.
114 Dmitri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture, p. 55.
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Commentator”. In addition, Averroes depicts Avicenna as a deviant 
Aristotelian and a lousy commentator. Before assessing Avicenna’s worth 
as a commentator, let me review this historiography. 
Averroes is known in the West in two guises: fi rst, as the Commentator 
on Aristotle’s works (with the exception of  a few like the Politics).115 This 
appellation came about because he gave the most literal and extensive 
commentary then available, and because in large part the West received 
the works of  Aristotle in Latin translation incorporated into Averroes’ 
commentary. Second, as the leader of  Averroism in the Renaissance, 
where, among other things, he was followed for his views on the active 
intellect. In his latter guise, his Incoherence of  the Incoherence assumed 
prominence, where he debates with Al-Ghazālī over the orthodoxy of  
the views of  the philosophers. Yet even here Averroes mostly follows 
the Greek commentators and occasionally earlier Islamic commentators 
like al-Fārābī or Avicenna . 
Thus the medievals reckoned Averroes as “The Commentator” of  
Aristotle without equal. At any rate, so they appellated him. Why did 
he deserve to have this name so imposed?
The usual story is this: Averroes , that is, Abu’l Walid Muhammad 
ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Rushd, was born at Cordoba in 
Andalusia in the twelfth century into a family of  jurists and theolo-
gians of  the literalist tradition. He himself  became a judge, as well 
as a court physician and a philosopher. He was commissioned by the 
caliph, Abū Ya{qūb , to write a series of  commentaries on Aristotle, so 
that the doctrine could be understood more clearly and used by the 
Islamic community.116 
At the least this standard view of  Averroes as The Commentator 
needs modifi cation. For we know that there were many literal com-
mentaries on Aristotle’s works available before Averroes and indeed 
before Avicenna , notably in Baghdad. Perhaps the point remains that 
those in Spain did not have these works accessible, and so needed a 
set of  Aristotle commentaries locally. However, Muslim Spain was not 
that isolated: recall that Maimonides managed to move from Spain to 
Africa to Egypt. 
At any rate, upon his commission from the caliph, Averroes then wrote 
a series of  threefold commentaries on most of  the works of  Aristotle. 
115 Oliver Leaman , Averroes and his Philosophy (Oxford, 1988), p. 179.
116 George Hourani , Averroes on the Harmony of  Philosophy and Religion (Leiden, 1959), 
pp. 12–3.
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For most of  the works, he wrote an epitome, a medium-length or 
middle commentary, and a long commentary. For him, these com-
mentaries had different functions: 1) the epitomes were designed for 
general use, and accordingly contained many remarks not to be found 
in the works of  Aristotle, so as to relate the doctrines of  Aristotle to the 
current conditions in Muslim Andalusia; 2) the middle commentaries 
were designed for the religious authorities, those who had a profound 
knowledge of  Islam but were not philosophers; 3) the long commen-
taries were designed for specialists, sc., for the few, elite philosophers. 
This division of  labor among the commentaries agrees with Averroes’ 
theory of  the threefold levels of  truth: the rhetorical, the dialectical, 
and the demonstrative.117 
Averroes ’ commentaries follow in the tradition of  his native culture 
and jurisprudence: they are literalist. Despite the insistence of  some 
on the brilliance of  Averroes,118 I can fi nd nothing original in detail in 
Averroes that cannot be found in earlier philosophers and commenta-
tors, notably Alexander and Themistius . The exceptions concern general 
and not particular features, as I discuss next. We might call him not “the 
Commentator” as the medievals did, but ‘the Paraphraser’. However, 
I am not certain that this is a criticism. For Averroes was a literalist. 
Further, at his time, given that many commentators on Aristotle, like 
Porphyry , Simplicius , and al-Fārābī , had injected Neoplatonic and 
Stoic infl uences, and others, like Avicenna , had departed greatly from 
the text, a literalist interpretation, intent on reclaiming the original 
Aristotle, had some value. 
Moreover, Averroes did not paraphrase blindly all of  Aristotle’s works 
nor the earlier commentaries, especially of  Alexander of  Aphrodisias. 
For instance, take his commentary on the Poetics. Note that Islam had 
no tradition of  theater. Accordingly, Averroes had no experience of  
plays, whether tragic or comic. Now, in writing his commentary on the 
Poetics, Averroes did not follow Avicenna ’s lead, of  trying, pathetically, 
to explain what tragedies and comedies were on the basis, it seems, of  
marginalia in the Arabic translations of  the Poetics. Instead, he looked for 
counterparts for tragedies and comedies in his own culture. He found 
them in the poetical traditions of  eulogy and satire. His examples are 
not as silly as you might think. Indeed, they give some plausibility to the 
117 Hourani , On the Harmony of  Religion and Philosophy, pp. 64–6.
118 E.g., Leaman , Averroes pp. 10; 110.
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claim that Aristotle’s philosophy, or, if  you like, philosophy in general, 
has some claim to being transcultural. 
Another instance of  Averroes ’ independent thought concerns politi-
cal theory. Averroes commented on most works of  Aristotle. One big 
exception is the Politics. In its place, he commented on Plato ’s Republic. 
We can suspect various reasons for this. One is that Averroes is follow-
ing the Islamic tradition of  al-Fārābī et al., who commented upon and 
extended the doctrines of  Plato’s Republic to Islam. Another is that he 
would have found Plato’s political theory more relevant to the caliphate 
structure of  government common in Andalusia. A third is that, given 
his own theory of  the threefold levels of  truth, he would have found 
Plato’s view of  the relation of  philosophy and religion, with its sup-
porting doctrines, more congenial or, at any rate, more explicit than 
Aristotle’s. Still, on the whole, Averroes does little in his commentaries 
besides present Aristotle’s texts in a close reading, with explications 
drawn from earlier commentators. 
Averroes may though have had originality in his depiction of  Avicenna . 
In his debate with Al-Ghazālī , largely unknown to the medieval West, 
he defended philosophy by offering Avicenna as a scapegoat. In general 
he asserts that Aristotle and the like do not have views antithetical to 
Islam. Rather only Aristotle as interpreted by Avicenna does. Averroes 
concedes the incoherence of  a philosopher, sc., of  Avicenna’s views, 
both with the text of  Aristotle and with the truth, while defending the 
coherence of  the other philosophers. 
In this, Averroes may have been partly responsible for the Latin 
medievals’ having an “Avicenne fi ctif,” as well as an “Aristote fi ctif.” For 
instance, he represents Avicenna as defi ning the possible as what has 
a cause and the necessary existent as what does not have a cause.119 
True, Avicenna does hold that the “possible existent” needs a cause to 
exist while the necessary existent does not.120 Still, he holds too that 
the logically possible itself  like the necessary needs no cause for being 
possible: it is possible in itself. Averroes makes other mistakes about 
Avicenna’s doctrines, e.g., that he denied that there can be an infi nite 
number of  souls.121 Again, Averroes accuses Avicenna of  being wrong 
on the nature of  the empirical agent, and sides with Aristotle. However, 
119 Van den Bergh , Tahāfut, pp. 164–6 [277–80].
120 Al-Ilāhiyyāt I.6.
121 Van den Bergh , Tahāfut, p. 163 [274], but see p. 14 n. 6; n. 1 and Al-Ilāhiyyāt 
IX.3–4.
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he does not seem to have Aristotle’s view correctly.122 Again, Averroes 
may be making the same mistake in accusing Avicenna for introducing 
matter for incorporeal substances and not following Aristotle.123
Again, in his Questions on Logic, Averroes sees Avicenna as the odd-
ball among commentators who has committed many errors both of  
interpretation and of  philosophy. He insists, against Avicenna, that the 
copula serves merely to connect subject and predicate and not to make 
an assertion of  existence.124 He particularly dislikes Avicenna’s analysis 
(derived from Sosigenes and Alexander ) of  necessary and categorical 
propositions into different types according to the duration of  the exis-
tence of  the subject and the time of  predication.125 However, Averroes’ 
own views look peculiar. He says that the existence of  individual men 
has no relevance to the truth of  ‘every man is animal’ because “the 
universals are not generable.”126 That is, a universal proposition concerns 
universals and not individuals. This surely moves away from Aristotle’s 
insistence on the primacy of  individual substances. (Averroes may have 
been inclined to this view by his view of  the copula.)
One circumstance that might explain Averroes ’ inaccurate portrait 
of  Avicenna —and Aristotle?—concerns the philosophical community 
in Spain at his time. There were then some rather fervent followers of  
al-Fārābī and Avicenna.127 Averroes might be attacking their interpreta-
tions rather than the tortuous texts of  Avicenna.
We might further explain a lot of  Averroes ’ claims in light of  his 
political motives.128 He wanted to make philosophy respectable to 
122 Van den Bergh , Tahāfut, pp. 108–9 [180–2]; 108 n. 1. Aristotle, Metaphysics 
1073a 28
123 Van den Bergh , Tahāfut, p. 160 [270–1], but cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1069b 25
124 Quaestiones in libros logicae, in Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis (Venice 
1562–74; repr. Frankfurt-am-Main, 1962), vol. Ib 78B. (I have consulted the Arabic 
text in D. M. Dunlop , “Averroes on the Modality of  Propositions,” Islamic Studies 1 
(1962), when available: §§11–2, pp. 32–4).
125 Quaestiones 79L; 80B. He says, 80B-C, that Avicenna has a different view in An-Najāt 
(so too Nicholas Rescher, Studies in the History of  Arabic Logic (Liverpool) 1963, p. 104. 
But cf. the notes above: Avicenna seems there only to be summarizing and simplifying 
his doctrines. George Hourani , “Ibn Sina on Necessary and Possible Existence,” The 
Philosophical Forum 14.1 (1974), p. 74, agrees.
126 Quaestiones, 80C.
127 Nicholas Rescher , Studies in the History of  Arabic Logic, p. 90.
128 Cf. Barry Kogan , Averroes and the Metaphysics of  Causation (Albany, 1985), pp. 7; 12–5; 
722–3. He says, pp. 52–3, that Averroes is concealing his real views in the Tahāfut. 
But where then are they? In his “commentaries” on Aristotle? Cf. too, Thérèse-Ann 
Druart , “Averroes on God’s Knowledge of  Being qua Being,” in Studies in Thomistic 
Theology, ed. P. Lockey (Houston, 1996), p. 185.
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Muslim fundamentalists perhaps at the cost of  truth. Too, Averroes 
may be attacking some of  his Avicennian contemporaries more than 
Avicenna himself. For many of  Avicenna’s current followers ascribe some 
of  Alexander ’s doctrines to him: the world as a necessary eternal animal; 
the divinity of  the heavenly animal.129 Given also his political motives, 
Averroes may well be attacking them more than Avicenna proper.
At any rate, clearly Averroes has the goal of  making philosophy 
respectable to Muslims. E.g., on miracles he says: 
The ancient philosophers did not discuss the problem of  miracles, since 
according to them such things must not be examined and questioned, for 
they are the principles of  the religions, and the man who inquires into 
them and doubts them deserves punishment, like the man who examines 
the other general religious principles, such as whether God exists . . .130 
Given Aristotle’s (and Plato ’s!) contempt for popular religion, these 
claims have little truth.131 But they would serve to clear Aristotle of  
heresy, as Averroes wanted. For, at the conclusion of  his Tahāfut, Averroes 
says that Al-Ghazālī had accused the philosophers of  heresy, and now 
he has cleared them of  the charges.132
Averroes then may clear philosophy of  heresy at the cost of  making 
an Aristotle and an Avicenna fi ctif. Indeed he may have created one 
or more Averroes fi ctifs too! For his views in his various works do not 
agree.133
So what to make of  Averroes ? He did write reliable, literal com-
mentaries paraphrasing Aristotle’s texts and previous commentaries on 
them. He also misrepresents Aristotle’s views, especially in his debate 
129 Van den Bergh , Tahāfut, p. 254 [421]. Averroes : Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, Simon van den 
Bergh, trans. & comm. (London 1954). The numbers in brackets are page numbers 
from the Arabic, Averroes, Tahafot at-tahafot, ed. Maurice Bouyges (Beirut 1930). Also 
I consulted Beatrice Zedler , trans. & comm., Destructio Destructionum Philosophiae Algazels 
(Milwaukee, 1961).
130 Van den Bergh , Tahāfut, p. 315 [514]. Averroes approves of  religion pragmati-
cally, because religion causes virtue in men. Cf. too p. 359 [580–2].
131 Alfred Ivry , “Towards a Unifi ed View of  Averroes ’ Philosophy,” The Philosophical 
Forum 14.1 (1974), p. 108, says, “It seems well nigh impossible for Averroes to modify 
his position to accommodate the dogmas of  religion or any particularist religion . . . in 
Averroes’ view certain locutions [in the political sphere] are ones that are absurd out-
side that sphere.” Ivry, pp. 109–10, has the implausible view that Averroes is struggling 
towards a view that the philosophical viewpoint is just as metaphorical and inadequate 
as the religious one.
132 Van den Bergh , Tahāfut, p. 362 [587].
133 Cf. George Hourani , Averroes on the Harmony of  Religion and Philosophy (London 
1961), pp. 41–54; 77, who attributes two different views to Averroes.
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with Al-Ghazālī , for the sake of  making philosophy respectable in Islam. 
In doing so he caricatures Avicenna so as to offer him as a scapegoat 
for the devout to sacrifi ce instead of  philosophy entire. This caricature 
may have distorted later views on Avicenna’s worth as a commentator 
on Aristotle. 
Conclusions
I have some sympathy for Hintikka ’s complaint: 
. . . those who have not themselves wrestled with serious conceptual issues 
tend to underestimate by orders of  magnitude the extent to which a 
great philosopher has to struggle against confusion, contradictions, and 
other diffi culties.134 
One advantage medieval commentators have here over contemporary 
ones, despite their linguistic and historical poverty, lies in their having 
this same pragmatic interest: they seek to do Aristotelian science, not 
merely talk about it.
What sort of  commentator would Aristotle himself  have like to have 
had? Judging by how he treats his predecessors, including his friend and 
teacher Plato , he would have wanted someone who would comment on 
his writings in the way that he did upon Plato’s writings. 
His own student and successor Theophrastus did so upon his writings. 
Thus he disagreed with Aristotle on the validity of  the mixed modal 
Barbara syllogism. He challenged Aristotle’s account of  the intellect 
and his astronomy. Hardly a tractable student. 
Now certainly, like Theophrastus , Avicenna fi ts Aristotle’s criteria for 
a commentator far more than Averroes does. At times Avicenna defends 
Aristotle’s entire doctrine. At other times, he will reject Aristotle’s teach-
ings almost completely. 
Would Aristotle like this? Certainly he treated his own teacher and his 
other predecessors thus. Yet we may distinguish choosing a successor 
of  a school and a tradition from selecting someone to comment upon 
and preserve the original content of  a member of  that school. In this 
way, commentators are more like curators and historians, and less like 
those who wish to continue the tradition of  the school. 
134 Jaakko Hintikka , “The Development of  Aristotle’s Ideas of  Scientifi c Method,” 
in Aristotle’s Philosophical Development, ed. W. Wians (Lanham, Md., 1996), p. 84.
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Should Aristotle like this? Suppose Aristotle had been put in the 
position of  designing his own ideal commentator. Should he choose 
one dedicated to preserving his legacy and prevent it from being cor-
rupted by later interpolations, corrections and emendations? Or one 
who would take his results as starting points for future research—as is 
indeed done in the sciences, which themselves have an Aristotelian base 
in doctrine as well as in their organization? Let us have Aristotle playing 
the Creator of  The Commentator. In De libero arbitrio III.16, Augustine 
argues that it is better for God to create beings with free will who may 
well disobey His precepts and the path that He has set for them than 
to create beings who will do the right, divinely prescribed thing without 
having to make choices on their own. Now, just on those grounds alone, 
Aristotle may well prefer commentators of  independent mind. But in 
his case, as his own views do not have the divine guarantee of  being 
the truth, he has the additional ground for preferring commentators 
following the truth where it leads them, that his successors might make 
better choices and get better results than he did. 
So I submit that Aristotle would choose Avicenna , not Averroes , to 
comment upon his works. Now we pedants may prefer the style of  
paraphrase and footnote. And of  course such a style has its uses for 
those seeking to become familiar with a text—for students, be they 
beginning or advanced. Yet this approach does not make the philoso-
phy being commented upon a living enterprise capable of  growth and 
progress, but rather an antique curiosity suitable for custodians and 
gawkers. Averroes may rightly have been The Commentator for the 
Latin medievals just beginning to study Aristotle. Yet, judging by the 
citations of  Avicenna at key points in discussions by Aquinas , Scotus , 
Ockham et al., Avicenna was The Commentator for these working, 
creative philosophers. Perhaps we moderni—or post-moderni—also should 
take stock and reconsider what we want in a commentator.
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